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INTRODUCTION
On Friday morning, April 2, 1993, Philip Morris announced its
plans to slash the average price of its Marlboro line of cigarettes by
forty cents per pack.' Philip Morris also reported that the price cut
would reduce projected earnings of its tobacco products for 1993 by
nearly forty percent relative to the previous year.2 The stock
market responded quickly to the events of this day, later labelled
"Marlboro Friday": Philip Morris's common stock lost nearly
twenty-five percent of its value, plummeting from $64.125 per share
at the close of trading on April 1 to $49.375 per share by the close
of trading on April 2. Less than five hours after Philip Morris's
announcement, plaintiffs filed the first of ten class-action lawsuits
alleging fraud violations under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 with respect to the Marlboro
brand.3 Each separate class action claimed that Philip Morris had
used fraudulent statements to augment the price of Philip Morris's
common stock.4 Among the plaintiffs' attorneys firms leading the
several class actions was Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach,5
which prior to the Philip Morris suit had earned millions through
settlements of other suits against newly public firms whose securities
had performed poorly in aftermarket trading.6 Unlike the vast
majority of securities litigation, however, the class actions against
Philip Morris did not end in settlement.7 Rather, almost two years
later, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
' Marlboro cigarettes are the most popular cigarettes sold in the United States,
and sales of full-priced brands of cigarettes such as Marlboro constitute nearly 90%
of the profits for Philip Morris's tobacco operations. See In re Philip Morris Sec.
Litig., 872 F. Supp. 97, 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
2 See id.
3 Four more suits were filed that same day. The remaining five suits were filed
the following business day, Monday, April 5, 1993. See id. at 98.
4 See id.
' Other plaintiffs' attorneys law firms filing suit included Abbey & Ellis and
Barrack, Rodos & Bacine. SeeJunda Woo,Judges Show Growing Skepticism in Class-
Action Securities Cases, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 1995, at B8.
' "Aftermarket" refers to the secondary securities market. For example, trades
between investors on the New York Stock Exchange and on NASDAQ are part of the
aftermarket. This is distinguished from the primary market which involves the
offering of securities from companies directly to investors. In 1994 alone, Milberg,
Weiss was among the principal law firms in cases that eventually settled for $295
million. SeeJill Abramson & Amy Stevens, Class-Action Clash: King of "Strike Suits"
Finds Style Cramped By Legal-Overhaul Bill, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 1995, at Al.
" Over 90% of securities class actions eventually end in settlement. See infra part
II.A.2 (reporting the disposition of suits in an IPO sample).
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dismissed the case, finding no evidence of fraud on Philip Morris's
part.' In its decision, the court pointed out that Milberg, Weiss's
initial complaint alleged that Philip Morris-a cigarette company-
had engaged in conduct "'to create and prolong the illusion of
[Philip Morris'] success in the toy industry."'9 More importantly, the
short time span between Philip Morris's Marlboro Friday announce-
ment and the first class-action filing-less than five hours-led the
district court to question the diligence of the plaintiffs' attorneys in
investigating the presence of actual fraud on Philip Morris's part."°
Rather than turning on the presence of any fraud, Milberg, Weiss's
case seemed to depend primarily on the size of Philip Morris's
common stock price decline.
The Philip Morris case illustrates a much-debated phenomenon
in the securities industry: the frivolous lawsuit.1  Opportunistic
plaintiffs' attorneys continuously monitor securities prices, probing
for recent offerings that perform poorly in the aftermarket. Once
a security's price suffers a decline sufficient to generate a potential
damages award large enough to cover the expected costs of litiga-
tion, plaintiffs' attorneys bring suit, hoping for a swift settlement.
Defendants of such suits-including the issuer, directors and officers
of the issuer, auditors, attorneys, and underwriters-almost always
settle. Several factors compel settlement, including: the risk
aversion of the directors and officers, the existence of directors and
officers' insurance, and the desire of the issuer and underwriters to
minimize negative publicity and to mitigate the costs of defending
against a prolonged frivolous suit. 2
'See In re Philip Morris Sec. Litig., 872 F. Supp. 97, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
9 Id. at 98 (alteration in original) (quoting plaintiffs' complaint).
" See id. In data presented to the Senate Securities Subcommittee, Melvyn I.
Weiss indicated that of the 229 securities class actions that Milberg, Weiss filed from
1990 to 1993, 157 were filed within 10 days of the information disclosures upon
which the plaintiffs' claims were based. See Private Litigation Under the Federal
Securities Laws: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 141, 465-70, 472-502, 538-
46 (1993) (letter from Melvyn I. Weiss to Sen. Donald W. Riegle, Jr., Chairman,
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs).
" For another example, see Hershfang v. Citicorp, 767 F. Supp. 1251, 1258
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (criticizing the plaintiffs' attorneys for filing a complaint made up
primarily of newspaper clippings without any specific facts relating to the culpability
of the defendants).
12 SeeJanet C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 529-57 (1991) (observing that the desire of
corporate directors and officers to settle class-action lawsuits is matched by
an eagerness among plaintiffs' lawyers to collect their contingency fees through
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Recently, Congress responded to the problem of frivolous
securities-fraud suits by enacting the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995's (Reform Act) over President Clinton's
veto.'4 Through the Reform Act, Congress attempted to curtail
the ability of plaintiffs' attorneys to rely upon professional plaintiffs'
class representatives and to increase the ability of institutional
investors to take control of securities-fraud class actions. 15 In
addition, class-action complaints must now plead the alleged fraud
with particularity, and courts are required to review such complaints
for violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.16 Soft informa-
tion projections are also given greater protection through an
expanded safe harbor provision under the Reform Act. 7 A
question remains, however, as to the general nature of securities
class actions. As the Philip Morris case demonstrates, some
frivolous securities class actions do occur. But do frivolous suits
predominate? Is there any evidence of merit-based enforcement
actions?
Many scholars view class-action suits with a mixture of approba-
tion and skepticism. Some perceive class actions as playing an
enforcement role and contend that class actions serve as an
settlement).
"s Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (to be codified at scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.) (amending the Securities Act and the Exchange Act).
14 See Several experts have commented on the impact of reform. See, e.g.,John C.
Coffee, Jr., Securities Litigation Reform: An Agenda for the Senate, N.Y. LJ., Mar. 23,
1995, at 5 (explaining the probable impact of such reforms as "loser pays" and the
abolition of the "fraud on the market" theory); William S. Lerach, Prevalence and
Economic Impact of Securities Class Actions: Is Reform Necessary?, in AVOIDING AND
MANAGING SECURITIES LITIGATION AND SEC ENFORCEMENT INQUIRIES FOR IN-HOUSE
COUNSEL 1995, at 7, 10, 13-23 (PLI Corp. Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-
888, 1995) (arguing that these proposals "would cripple private enforcement of the
anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, weaken the integrity of
our nation's securities markets, damage investors and ultimately undermine capital
formation, which depends upon honest markets").
"s See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, sec. 101, 109 Stat. at 738-
49 (to be codified at Securities Act § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1, and Securities Exchange
Act § 21D, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4).
" See sec. 101(a), 109 Stat. at 737-38 (to be codified at Securities Act § 27 (a)(2),
15 U.S.C. 77z-1(a)(2)); sec. 101(b), 109 Stat. at 743 (to be codified at Securities
Exchange Act § 21D(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)); see also FED. R. Ciw. P. 11
(enumerating circumstances under which a court may and must impose sanctions on
an attorney).
' See sec. 102(a), 109 Stat. at 749-52 (to be codified at Securities Act § 27A, 15
U.S.C. § 77z-2); sec. 102(b), 109 Stat. at 753-56 (to be codified at Securities Exchange
Act § 21E, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5). Due to the relatively recent enactment of the Reform
Act, this Article does not deal specifically with any of its provisions.
FRAUD IN THE NEW-ISSUES MARKET
important check on management and ensure the adequacy of
corporate disclosure."8 Under this enforcement theory, share-
holder litigation complements the SEC's own policing activities,
9
providing plaintiffs and plaintiffs' attorneys with an incentive to
ferret out misleading disclosures and safeguard the integrity of
financial markets. Detractors of the recent Reform Act, for
example, contend strenuously that the majority of suits are indeed
merit based and that restricting securities-fraud suits exposes
unsuspecting shareholders to the sharp practices of misleading
issuers.2" Others, however, view the class action as a mechanism
for plaintiffs' attorneys to extract rents from the corporate treasur-
ies of defendant firms and insurance companies.21 They argue that
" See e.g., William S. Lerach, Securities Class Actions and Derivative Litigations
Involving Public Companies: A Plaintiff's Perspective, in 1 SECuRITIEs LITIGATION 7, 13-
18 (Bruce G. Vanyo & Edward J. Yodowitz eds., 1985) (suggesting that private
securities litigation is necessary to curb corporate excesses that would otherwise pass
unchallenged by overburdened regulatory agencies); Joel Seligman, The Merits Do
Matter:. A Comment on Professor Grundfest's "Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under
the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority", 108 HARv. L. REV. 438,439-57
(1994) (arguing that Professor Grundfest has failed to establish adequately the need
for new legislative restrictions on federal securities litigation); see also Barbara A.
Banoff & Benjamin S. Duval, Jr., The Class Action As a Mechanism for Enforcing the
Federal Securities Laws: An Empirical Study of the Burdens Imposed, 31 WAYNE L. REV.
1, 32 ("Proponents say that class actions promote judicial economy, compensate the
victims of wrongdoing, prevent unjust enrichment, and deter future misconduct.");
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'Attomey's Role in Class Action
and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendationsfor Reform, 58 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1991) (describing economicjustifications for class-action suits); David
Rosenberg, Class Actionsfor Mass Torts: Doing IndividualJustice By Collective Means, 62
IND. L.J. 561, 562 (1987) (arguing that class actions in the context of mass torts
promote collective benefits of process efficiency, outcome consistency, and welfare
maximization).
19 Both the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994), and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1994), empower the SEC to
enforce the SEC's rules and regulations. Section 20(a) of the Securities Act gives the
SEC the power to conduct investigations into possible Securities Act violations. See
15 U.S.C. § 77s. Under § 20(b) of the Securities Act, the SEC may seek injunctive
relief from the federal courts for actual or imminent violations. See 15 U.S.C. § 77t.
Section 21(a) of the Exchange Act empowers the SEC to conduct investigations into
possible Exchange Act violations. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a). Under § 21(d) of the
Exchange Act, the SEC may seek injunctive relief for actual or imminent violations.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d).2oSee Lerach, supra note 14, at 18-22, 31, 32.
21 See Alexander, supra note 12, at 570-77;John C. Coffee,Jr., Rethinking the Class
Action: A Policy Primer on Reform, 62 IND. L.J. 625, 638-39 (1987) [hereinafter Coffee,
Rethinking the Class Action];John C. Coffee,Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff
As Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 5, 9
[hereinafter Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion]; see also Sylvia R. Lazos, Note, Abuse in
Plaintiff Class Action Settlements: The Need for a Guardian During Pretrial Settlement
1996]
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the overwhelming desire of defendants to avoid trial inevitably
results in strike suits seeking a favorable settlement.
Whether securities-fraud suits are merit based or strike-suit
based assumes a particular significance in the new-issues market.
The cost of strike suits is especially burdensome for companies
going public for the first time. Although larger, more established
companies may enjoy alternative sources of funding, new growth
companies often must resort to the public equity markets.2 2
Furthermore, new-growth companies often have volatile stock prices
and lack a disclosure track record, making them particularly
vulnerable to strike suits. On the other hand, the danger to
investors is also especially acute during initial public offerings
(IPOs). Much uncertainty surrounds the issuance of a private
company's equity.23  Investors generally possess only limited
information on the value of an IPO; the issuing firm's managers
themselves may have only rough estimates of an IPO's fundamental
value. 24 As a result, agency problems exist at the time a firm goes
public:25  owners of the firm have an incentive to inflate the
prospects of the firm to ensure the success of the IPO. In addition,
insiders seeking to sell part of their holdings also have an incentive
to inflate the offer price and increase their receipts from the sale of
their shares.
Negotiations, 84MICH. L. REv. 308,311-19 (1985) (noting that plaintiffs' attorneys may
use the class-action device to extract nuisance suit settlements from defendants).
' Others have noted the importance of new-growth companies for our economy.
See, e.g., Anthony Q. Fletcher, Note, Curing Crib Death: Emerging Growth Companies,
Nuisance Suits, and Congressional Proposals for Securities Litigation Reform, 32 HARV.J.
ON LEGIs. 493, 495 (1995) ("Empirical data evinces that the confidence of venture
capitalists in the securities markets is critical to the overall health and stability of the
economy.").
" Several empirical phenomena exist in the new-issues market: new issues
are often underpriced relative to initial market valuation; new issues system-
atically tend to underperform similarly situated stocks over the long term; the
new-issues market is subject to hot issues periods of increased volume and under-
pricing. See Jay R. Ritter, The Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings, 46J.
FIN. 3, 3 (1991) (stating that numerous studies have documented "the (short-
run) underpricing phenomenon" and "the 'hot-issue' market phenomenon"); Kevin
Rock, Why New Issues Are Underpriced, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 187, 188 (1986) (recogniz-
ing the anomaly in the new-issues market that "shares appear to be issued at a
discount").
24 See Rock, supra note 23, at 187-93 (noting that it is not uncommon for issuers
to receive exaggerated data regarding investors' interest in new shares).
25 These agency problems arise among the issuing firm's managers, existing
shareholders, and the new shareholders.
FRAUD IN THE NEW-ISSUES MARKET
Because of the importance of securities-fraud actions to the new-
issues market, this Article examines the incidence of securities class
actions and reports their effect on the performance of IPOs from
1975 to 1986.26 This Article tests the enforcement versus strike-suit
theories of class actions and provides insights into the incentives of
plaintiffs' attorneys in the IPO context.27
Several authors have studied shareholder suits in other con-
texts.2" Professor Romano analyzed a sample of 139 suits consist-
ing of both derivative and direct shareholder suits.29 Because
Romano did not treat the suits arising out of IPOs as a separate
category, her article did not assess the impact of shareholder
lawsuits on the new-issues market. Professors Drake and
Vetsuypens 0  and Professor Alexander3l  each specifically
26 We stopped at 1986 to ensure that enough aftermarket data on stock price
performance and on the incidence of suits was obtainable for each IPO within the
sample.
27 Relatively few attorneys specialize in complex securities class-action litigation.
The major securities class-action plaintiffs' attorneys law firms are: Milberg, Weiss,
Bershad, Specthrie & Lerach (New York); Abbey & Ellis (New York); Stull, Stull, &
Brody (New York); Berger & Montague (Philadelphia); Much, Shelist, Freed,
Denbenberg, Ament & Eiger (Chicago); and Wolf, Popper, Ross, Wolf &Jones (New
York). See Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 67 n.197.
28 In recent years, commentators have noted an increase in class-action suits based
upon securities-fraud violations stemming from IPOs. See Michael Selz, Lawsuits Often
Follow When Small Firms Go Public, WALL ST.J.,Jan. 13, 1992, at B2. High-technology
companies in particular have experienced a large increase in the number of securities
class actions they face. See Ross Kerber, Shareholder Suits Prompt Reform Push:
Company Officials Seek Laws to Limit Their Vulnerability, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 1993, at
HI; Wade Lambert, Corporate Settlement Costs Hit a Record, WALL ST.J., Mar. 10, 1995,
at B3. The overall incidence of securities class actions, however, has not increased.
See infra part II.A.1 (reporting data on the incidence of securities class actions in our
sample of IPOs). From 1990 to 1991, plaintiffs filed over 600 securities class-action
complaints in federal courts-more than in the previous five years combined. See Selz,
supra, at B2. Approximately a quarter of these cases were related to securities
offerings. Companies settled in over 95% of these suits, often with liability insurers
reimbursing most of the settlement costs. See id.; see also infra notes 73-75 and
accompanying text (discussing liability insurance).
' See Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7J.L.
ECON. & ORGANIZATION 55, 59 (1991). Romano tracked shareholder suits brought
against a random sample of 535 New York Stock Exchange and Over-the-Counter
firms from the late 1960s until 1987. These suits included suits dealing with
acquisitions, takeover defenses, self-dealing, and securities-fraud-related complaints.
Testing the efficacy of shareholder suits as a means of controlling managerial moral
hazard, she found that although shareholder suits resulted in some structural changes,
the suits overall acted as only a weak means of corporate governance. See id. at 80-85.
o See Philip D. Drake & Michael R. Vetsuypens, IPO Underpricing and Insurance
Against Legal Liability, 22 FIN. MGMT. 64 (1993). Drake and Vetsuypens also found
that the median value of settlements as a percentage of aftermarket losses was 23.8%.
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addressed the issue of shareholder litigation arising out of misstate-
ments in IPO prospectuses. 2 Alexander found some evidence that
See id. at 69.
s' See Alexander, supra note 12, at 507-14.
32 Several other recent empirical studies have looked at the characteristics of fraud
class actions in the general securities market context not specific to IPOs. These
studies focused on only those firms that experienced a suit and did not examine those
firms which did not get sued. The studies provided conflicting evidence as to the
importance of merit in securities class-action settlements.
Jennifer Francis, Donna Philbrick, and Katherine Schipper conducted a study of
the outcomes of 91 class-action suits brought under either Rule IOb-5 or section 11
of the Securities Act from 1988 to 1991. SeeJennifer Francis et al., Determinants and
Outcomes in Class Action Securities Litigation 1 (Aug. 1994) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with authors). Looking only at the computers, chemicals, electronics,
and retailing four-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes, they did not
restrict their suits to IPO securities class actions. See id. at 2. Matching their suits
with industry peer firms and size-matched firms, they found that lawsuit firms tended
to be larger than their industry peers. Furthermore, firms in the lawsuit sample were
more likely to have been audited by the Big Six accounting firms in the industry-
watched control group. See id. They also found no evidence that lawsuit firms
experienced more volatile returns or poorer financial performance, although lawsuit
firms did have higher systematic risk. See id. at 3. Looking at measures of company-
initiated disclosure and outsider-initiated disclosure, they found significantly higher
levels of disclosure for lawsuit firms than both industry and size-matched peer firms.
Finally, they found that damages were related in a nonlinear fashion to settlement
amounts. See id. at 4.
Frederick C. Dunbar and Vinita M.Juneja studied the factors driving settlement
in securities class actions. Looking at 334 securities class actions betweenJuly 1991
andJune 1993, they found that the three main factors driving settlement were stock
price volatility, availability of assets, and merits of the case. In their test of the merits,
they looked at two different merit measures. First, they found that the presence of
a § 11 claim did not affect the overall settlement amount. Second, they found that
concurrent government enforcement did not increase the settlement amount. Taking
both the presence of a § 11 claim and government enforcement as merit-related
factors, they concluded that of the three factors affecting the settlement amount,
merit was the least important. See FREDERICK C. DUNBAR & VINITA M. JUNEJA,
NATIONAL ECONOMIC RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., RECENT TRENDS II: WHAT
EXPLAINS SETTLEMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTIONS 21 (1993).
A study by Vincent E. O'Brien collected a sample of 330 securities class actions
from 1988 to 1991. O'Brien found that almost all of these cases settled; institutional
investors received most of the benefits from the settlements, and attorneys received
about 21% of the settlement amounts as their fees. O'Brien further found that the
suits were spread across a wide variety of different industry groups, different revenue
size firms, and firms of different ages. All lawsuit firms, however, did experience a
large drop in their stock price immediately prior to the suit. See Vincent E. O'Brien,
The Class-Action Shakedown Racket, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 1991, at A20.
Zoe-Vonna Palmrose examined the nature of the joint and several liability of
auditors in securities-fraud claims. Her sample consisted of 227 instances of alleged
audit failure involving the largest U.S. audit firms. She found that many claims
against auditors were "weak" in the sense that awards were only rarely paid out.
Rather, auditors were often dragged into litigation at high cost to the auditor under
the joint and several liability rule by plaintiffs' attorneys fishing for some damages
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shareholder suits, at least against computer-related IPOs, were
frivolous. Lawsuit IPO firms in her sample eventually settled for
essentially the same percentage of their maximum potential
damages award."3 From this finding, Alexander concluded that the
merits do not affect the settlement amount. The small size of
Alexander's sample (seventeen IPOs),"4 however, makes it difficult
to draw inferences about the incidence of litigation or the signifi-
cance of her findings. Drake and Vetsuypens examined ninety-three
IPOs which faced securities class actions between 1969 and 1990."
A number of authors have suggested that underwriters may
underprice IPOs to avoid lawsuits."6 To test this theory, Drake and
Vetsuypens compared the initial returns of firms that experienced
a lawsuit against a control group of IPO firms. They found no
evidence that firms experiencing lawsuits had less underpricing than
award or settlement. See Zoe-Vonna Palmrose, The Joint & Several vs. Proportionate
Liability Debate: An Empirical Investigation ofAudit-Related Litigation, 1 STAN.J.L. BUS.
& FIN. 53, 57, 67-68 (1995).
Steven Marino and Rende Marino examined a sample of 229 federal and state
securities law settlements from April 1989 through February 1994 in which accoun-
tants, attorneys, or underwriters were sued. They divided their sample into those
firms involved in "flagrant fraud" and those firms involved in less egregious instances
of fraud. See Steven P. Marino & Rende D. Marino, An Empirical Study of Recent
Securities Class Action Settlements Involving Accountants, Attorneys, or Underwriters, 22
SEC. REG. L.J. 115, 124 (1994) ("Flagrant fraud... is an intentional breaking of the
law by, for example, trading on insider information, fabricating invoices, or
transferring company funds to personal Swiss bank accounts."). Using this division,
they found that accountants contributed more than five times to settlement funds in
cases involving "flagrant fraud" than other cases. This they found statistically
significant at more than the 99% confidence level. From this, they concluded that
merit played a factor in determining the size of settlement amounts. See id. at 141-42.
For a critique of several recent empirical studies on securities class actions, see
Seligman, supra note 18, at 450-57. See also Andrew Rosenfield, An Empirical Test of
Class-Action Settlement, 5J. LEGAL STUD. 113, 116-17 (1976) (finding that in a sample
of 104 class actions, plaintiffs' attorneys earned a statistically significant "settlement
premium" for settled rather than litigated cases).
" See Alexander, supra note 12, at 517.
4 See id. at 510-11.
s See Drake & Vetsuypens, supra note 30, at 64.
s The lower the offering price, the less chance aftermarket trading will go below
this offering price to expose the underwriter to the possibility of suit. Similarly, the
lower the offering price starts, the greater the initial tradingjump in the stock price,
whichjuries may view as evidence that the issue was not overpriced at the time of the
offering. See Janet C. Alexander, The Lawsuit Avoidance Theory of Why Initial Public
Offerings Are Undeipriced, 41 UCLA L. REv. 17, 66-72 (1993) (noting the relationship
between the IPO price and the likelihood of legal action); Drake & Vetsuypens, supra
note 30, at 64 (same); Seha M. Tiniq, Anatomy of Initial Public Offerings of Common
Stock, 43J. FIN. 789, 795 (1988) (same).
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firms not experiencing suits." Furthermore, unlike Alexander,
they found that the settlement percentage of the aftermarket losses
varied widely among the lawsuit IPO firms.3" Drake and
Vetsuypens's study does not provide insights into the incidence of
shareholder litigation. Moreover, because their sample is composed
of cases with reported decisions or settlements, it is biased toward
cases involving important decisions and those cases which were not
dropped by plaintiffs.
This Article seeks to extend the previous empirical shareholder
litigation work and provide a broad-based examination of securities
class actions in the new-issues market. Because we look at the
entire sample of equity IPOs from 1975 to 1986, we avoid the small
sample size problems of Alexander's study and the bias problems of.
Drake and Vetsuypens's work. Importantly, unlike other previous
empirical work, we focus not only on those firms that were sued but
also on those firms that were not sued. In fact, 3396 IPOs in our
sample of 3519 IPOs were not subjects of lawsuits. Through a
comparison of the differences between the two sets of firms, we
hope to test more accurately the enforcement versus strike-suit
theories. Part I introduces the enforcement versus strike-suit
theories of securities class actions. Part II describes the empirical
sample of IPOs used in our study. We provide several summary
statistics of the IPO sample and the incidence of suits in Part II as
well as the implications for plaintiffs' attorneys' incentives and the
overall level of private securities law enforcement. Part III presents
our tests of the enforcement against the strike-suit theories of
securities-fraud class actions.
I. THE ENFORCEMENT VERSUS THE STRIKE-SUIT THEORIES
Administered and enforced by the Securities Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC), the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) 9 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)4" regulate the
initial public offerings process. The Securities Act, the Exchange
Act, and their related rules comprise a complex body of law aimed
at ensuring the adequate disclosure of information in securities
transactions to protect the interests of securities market partici-
s See Drake & Vetsuypens, supra note 30, at 69-70.
s8 See id. at 69.
so 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994).
40 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811(1994).
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pants. The securities laws adopt a market corrective approach,
seeking to enhance market efficiency through the dissemination of
information rather than through the direct regulation of the capital
markets.
While the SEC may initiate criminal and civil suits against firms
for securities law violations,41 private plaintiffs-including purchasers
in IPOs-also possess several avenues to obtain damages awards
from the issuing team42 involved in a fraudulent offering of
securities. IPO securities-fraud class-action plaintiffs may bring
misrepresentation or omission claims under the following federal
causes of action: (1) section 11 of the Securities Act;43 (2) section
12(a)(2) of the Securities Act;44 and (3) Rule 10b-545 under section
10(b) of the Exchange Act. Each cause of action has its own
particular restrictions and requirements as well as potential damages
awards. Liability under these provisions is contingent upon the
basic requirement of some omission or misrepresentation of a
material fact by the issuers in the public offering. Because actions
in the IPO context are most commonly filed under section 1146 and
41 See supra note 19 (describing SEC enforcement powers).
42 The issuing team includes the issuer, the underwriters, the auditors, and the
attorneys involved in the IPO.
43 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994).
44 15 U.S.C. § 771(1994), amended by Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, sec. 105, 109 Stat. 737, 757.
45 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995).
41 Section 11 applies only to securities offerings which the Securities Act requires
to be registered with the SEC. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k. Section 11 becomes enforceable
after the registration statement becomes effective and requires that some part of the
statement contain a material misrepresentation or omission of a fact necessary to
make statements in the document not misleading. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a). Section 11
allows plaintiffs to sue the signers of the registration statement, principal officers of
the issuer, directors of the issuer at the time of filing of the registration statement
with the SEC, accountants, engineers, appraisers, other professional experts who
prepare or certify a part of the registration statement, and underwriters. See
Securities Act § ll(a)(1)-(5), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(1)-(5). All defendants may be held
jointly and severally liable. See Securities Act § 11(f), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f), amended by
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, sec. 201(b),
§ 11(0, 109 Stat. 737, 761. Under section 11, the issuer is liable even in the absence
of scienter or negligence. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a); Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN,
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITY REGULATION 1005 (3d ed. 1995). Nonissuer defendants
may, however, claim a "due diligence" defense. See Securities Act § 11 (b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(b).
Section 11 misrepresentations or omissions must be material. Material facts
include those matters about which an average, prudent investor would reasonably
wish to be informed before making a trading decision involving the registered
securities. See, e.g., Lucia v. Prospect St. High Income Portfolio, Inc., 36 F.3d 170,
175 (1st Cir. 1994) (stating that "information is 'material' only if its disclosure would
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Rule 10b-547, this Article will focus on these two provisions.
alter the 'total mix' of facts available to the investor" and noting that this materiality
test is "clearly enunciated in our case law"); Kronfeld v. Trans World Airlines, 832
F.2d 726, 731 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating that information is material if there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in
making an investment decision). Section 11 does not require that a plaintiff prove
actual reliance. Defendants, however, may defend themselves against liability if they
can establish that the plaintiff actually knew of the falsity or omission when the
plaintiff bought the security. The Securities Act also provides that defendants may
shift the burden of showing reliance to the plaintiffs if the defendants can
demonstrate that the plaintiffs bought their securities after the issuer had made
generally available to all its security holders an earnings statement covering at least
the 12 months after the effective date of the registration statement. See Securities Act
§ 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a). Furthermore, section 11 does not require plaintiffs to
prove causation between the misrepresentation or omission and the price decline in
the IPO stock. See LOSs & SELIGMAN, supra, at 1004 ("[I]nstead of the plaintiff's
having to prove causation, damages are reduced to the extent that the defendant
proves that they did not result from his or her misconduct.... ."). The defendant
may reduce the damages amount, however, by proving that some or all of the price
decline was due to other exogenous factors. See Securities Act § 11(e), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(e) (1994). Section 11 suits are subject to a two-part statute of limitations.
Plaintiffs have up to one year to file suit after they discover or should have discovered
through reasonable diligence the falsehood or omission. Plaintiffs also must file suit
within three years after the closing date of the public offering. See Securities Act
§ 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1994).
"' Rule lOb-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange, (a) [t]o employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) [t]o make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or (c) [tio engage in any act, practice, or course
of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995).
Although not specific to public offerings, Rule 10b-5 provides plaintiffs with
potentially the broadest reach for securities liability. The set of potential defendants
reached under Rule lOb-5 extends well beyond that of section 11 to cover any
perpetrator of or participant in fraudulent activity "in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security." Id. Courts have found activities by defendants to be "in
connection" with the purchase or sale by the plaintiff of a security in cases where the
defendant merely disseminated false or misleading statements into the market
through a press release or other means reasonably calculated to affect investors
engaged in trading the security on the open market. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 858-61 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
Furthermore, Rule IOb-5 covers not only registered public offerings but also extends
to security transactions in secondary market trading. See Superintendent of Ins. v.
Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 (1971) ("[T]he fact that the transaction
is not conducted through a securities exchange or an organized over-the-counter
market is irrelevant to the coverage of § 10(b).").
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Section 11 and Rule 10b-5 suits are often brought through the
class-action mechanism and serve as complementary causes of action
for securities investor-plaintiffs. Unlike Rule 10b-5 which has a
potentially broader scope of liability, section 11 renders it easier for
investor-plaintiffs to prove their prima facie case. Furthermore,
section 11 does not require a plaintiff to prove scienter, reliance, or
causation. The defendant issuing team may rebut section l's
presumption of reliance and protect themselves against liability
through due diligence; the burden of proof, however, rests with the
defendants."
In a typical securities-fraud class-action suit, plaintiffs' attorneys
control the filing, prosecution, and settlement of the action."
The elements of a Rule 10b-5 action are as follows. First, the implied right to
damages available to private plaintiffs under Rule 1Ob-5 is available only to purchasers
or sellers of securities involved in the transaction in question. See Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 753-55 (1975). Second, Rule lOb-5 liability
requires that plaintiffs prove scienter on the part of the defendants. See Ernst &
Ernstv. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,201-15 (1976). Third, as in section 11, the plaintiff
under Rule lOb-5 must show the defendants' misrepresentation or omission was
material. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230-32 (1988). Fourth, Rule lOb-5
liability requires that the plaintiff prove that she actually relied on the falsehood or
omission to her detriment. See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.
1965). Note, however, that under the "fraud-on-the-market" theory, courts often
presume investor reliance on the validity of the market price. See, e.g., Basic, 485 U.S.
at 246-47 ("Because most publicly available information is reflected in market price,
an investor's reliance on any public material misrepresentations, therefore, may be
presumed.... ."). Fifth, the plaintiff must show a causal link between the defendants'
actions and the plaintiff's injury. Defendants may, however, argue that other
exogenous factors helped cause the aftermarket price decline and seek to limit
damages as a result. See, e.g.,Jon Koslow, Note, EstimatingAggregate Damages in Class-
Action Litigation Under Rule lOb-5 for Purposes of Settlement, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 811,
817 & n. 27 (1991) ("[T]he connected elements of materiality, reliance and causation
require that damages calculations under Rule lOb-5 exclude the effects of market
fluctuations unrelated to the fraud or misrepresentation.").
Until recently, no explicit Rule lOb-5 statute of limitations existed for private
causes of action. In 1991, however, the Supreme Court in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind,
Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 359 (1991), held that in private Rule
1Ob-5 causes of action, plaintiffs have up to one year to file suit after they learn or
reasonably should have learned of the misrepresentation or omission. Plaintiffs must
also file within three years after the alleged misrepresentation or omission took place.
48 See supra note 46 (summarizing the defenses against section 11 liability).
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act may significantly change the
securities class-action process. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (amending the Securities Act and the Exchange
Act). This Article deals only with securities class actions prior to the Reform Act and
does not address the its impact.
Many have commented on the agency problems the plaintiffs' class has in
monitoring and controlling its plaintiffs' attorneys. See Elliott J. Weiss & John S.
Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring How Institutional Investors Can Reduce
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Plaintiffs' attorneys use Quotrons and other information devices to
monitor stock prices carefully.5" Suits often follow large, precipi-
tous drops in a company's stock price. Some argue that plaintiffs'
attorneys, as a rule, automatically file suit after a ten-percent drop
in a company's stock price.5 Plaintiffs' attorneys race with one
another to file suit. Often, several securities class actions are filed
at once against a particular defendant. These suits are then
consolidated and transferred to one federal district court.52 Filing
the first suit increases a plaintiffs' attorney's chances of securing the
role as lead class counsel.5" Many class-action suits are filed within
days, sometimes even hours, of a large security price drop.
5 4
Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE LJ. 2053, 2064-79 (1995). Indeed,
Weiss and Beckerman even propose that procedural barriers to institutional investor
participation as the class representative be reduced to encourage these investors to
monitor plaintiffs' attorneys' activities more diligently. See id. at 2105-09. Although
institutional investor participation may reduce the agency problem between plaintiffs'
attorneys and the plaintiffs' class, this will not help reduce the incidence of frivolous
suits. Plaintiffs, just as much as plaintiffs' attorneys, gain from a frivolous suit ex
post. Once an investor owns stock in a corporation and the stock value plummets,
the investor benefits from pursuing a positive-value frivolous suit. This is even true
for investors who would value eliminating the threat of frivolous suits ex ante. So
long as frivolous suits are still possible ex post, these investors will always wish some
return for their investment, even through a frivolous suit.
" See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 49, at 2060-62; see also Private Litigation
Under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate
Comm. on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 24, 109 (1993)
(testimony of Richard J. Egan, Chairman of EMC Corporation) ("We think [the
plaintiffs' attorneys'] Quotrons are connected to their word processor.").
5' William Lerach, however, presents counterevidence that most firms which
experience a 10% drop in their stock price in one day are not sued under federal
securities laws. See Lerach, supra note 14, at 26-28.
512 See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 49, at 2062.
3 Many courts will simply appoint the plaintiffs' attorney who files first as lead
counsel. See id. at 2062-63 nn.41-44; see also Alexander, supra note 12, at 513-14
(arguing that the pressure on plaintiffs' attorneys to file first results in little prefiling
screening of potential securities defendants). Other courts allow the plaintiffs'
attorneys to decide for themselves who will become lead counsel. Filing first under
this system allows a plaintiffs' attorney to copy his complaint for other plaintiffs'
attorneys. These other plaintiffs' attorneys then also file suit separately, sharing in
the expected fee award and granting their support to the initial plaintiffs' attorney's
selection as lead counsel. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 49, at 2063. Recently,
however, at least one court has auctioned the lead counsel position to the lowest fee-
bidding plaintiffs' attorney. See In re Wells Fargo Sec. Litig., 157 F.R.D. 467, 476
(N.D. Cal. 1994). For an analysis of the implications of auctioning the lead counsel
position, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating Plaintiffs' Attorneys, N.Y. LJ., Sept. 22,
1994, at 5.
' See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 49, at 2060 & n.32.
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Because the lead counsel often grabs the lion's share of the fees, the
incentive to file first is considerable.
55
In order to increase their ability to react quickly to stock
price declines, plaintiffs' attorneys often maintain a stable of will-
ing potential plaintiffs' representatives in case the price of a
particular security drops.5" The numbers of different plaintiffs'
attorneys and different plaintiff's class representatives are remark-
ably limited. 5 There exist only relatively few plaintiffs' attorney
firms.58 Similarly, there are only a few people who repeatedly play
the role of plaintiffs' representative.59 These small numbers give
plaintiffs' attorneys great control over the class action. Given this
framework of securities litigation, this Part briefly reviews strike-suit
" See, e.g., Garr v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 22 F.3d 1274, 1277 (3d Cir. 1994) ("The
lead attorney position is coveted as it is likely to bring its occupant the largest share
of the fees generated by the litigation."). Lead counsel can claim most of the fees by
assigning herself most of the work in prosecuting the class action. See Weiss &
Beckerman, supra note 49, at 2062.
The Reform Act also reduces the incentives of being lead plaintiff. See Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, sec. 101, 109 Stat. at
738-49 (to be codified at Securities Act § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 7 7z-1, and Exchange Act
§ 21D, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4); see also supra notes 13-17, 49 and accompanying text
(discussing some of the changes of the Reform Act).
' SeeJonathan M. Moses, Lawyer Given to Filing Shareholder Lawsuits Comes Under
Scrutiny, WALL ST.J., Oct. 28, 1992, at Al, A13 (reporting that some securities plain-
tiffs' attorneys maintain lists of potential class representatives). Weiss and Beckerman
argue that plaintiffs' attorneys without their own stable of willing class representatives
must rely on an intermediary with a similar stable of shareholders. Otherwise, such
plaintiffs' attorneys would be at a disadvantage in pursuing a class action relative to
competing attorneys with ready access to possible plaintiffs' representatives and would
be unable to file a complaint within only a few days of relevant corporate announce-
ments. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 49, at 2061 n.35.
"' Cf Coffee, Rethinking the Class Action, supra note 21, at 634 ("[B]ecause the
process by which a cheap settlement can be exchanged for a high fee award necessar-
ily involves at least a tacit understanding within the plaintiff's attorneys' camp, such
an agreement can most easily develop among 'repeat players' who know and can trust
each other."). For a detailed examination of the securities class-action litigation
process, see Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 49, at 2058-64.
' See supra note 27 (listing major securities class-action plaintiffs' attorneys law
firms).
" For example, William B. Weinberger has served as plaintiffs' class representative
in numerous securities-fraud litigations. In our sample of lawsuits, Weinberger
appeared over 10 times. Others have found similar results: Harry Lewis was a named
plaintiff in an estimated 300-400 securities suits; Steven Cooperman was a plaintiff
in 19 suits; Rodney Shields was a plaintiff in 20 suits; and Weinberger himself
appeared in more than 90 securities class actions before his death. See Robert
Mednick &JeffreyJ. Peck, Proportionality: A Much-Needed Solution to the Accountants'
Legal Liability Crisis, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 867, 904-05 n.129 (1994).
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and enforcement theories relating to IPO securities class-action
suits.
A. The Strike-Suit Theory
Securities class actions may equip opportunistic plaintiffs and
their attorneys with a powerful device to extract value from poorly
performing IPOs.6 ° Several commentators have written on the
incentives of plaintiffs (or their attorneys) to file suit solely to obtain
settlement in cases where the expected value to plaintiffs from
going to trial is negative ("NEV suits")." Professors Rosenberg
and Shavell, for example, hypothesize that NEV suits exist because
defendants are willing to pay plaintiffs up to the sum of the
defendants' litigation, distraction, and reputation costs62 from
answering the plaintiffs' complaint and obtaining a dismissal." In
cases where plaintiffs enjoy a significant initial cost advantage over
defendants in conducting a lawsuit,6' defendants are often willing
to settle to avoid the actual costs of defending against the frivolous
" Seesupra note 21 and accompanying text (citing others who argue that securities
class actions are largely frivolous); see also Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply?, 108
HARV. L. REv. 727, 730-47 (1995) (arguing that frivolous suits do exist and that more
empirical analysis of these suits needs to be performed).
61 It is at first unclear why plaintiffs would file an NEV suit. To the extent
defendants realize that plaintiffs are filing an NEV suit, defendants will also know that
the plaintiffs' threat of going to trial is not credible. All defendants need do is sit and
wait; rational plaintiffs will then drop suit rather than face an NEV trial. In game
theory terms, it is not subgame perfect for plaintiffs to threaten to go to trial in
situations where they will receive a negative return from trial. The NEV models
developed below in the text and notes attempt to demonstrate why NEV suits may
still occur despite this subgame perfection problem.
6 The cost and distraction of defending a securities-fraud class-action suit can be
considerable. See Paul Sweeney, Full Siege Ahead, ACROSS THE BOARD, Nov.-Dec. 1994,
at 30, 32 (citing an American Express study that found that 70% of CEOs involved in
pending lawsuits spent a full day each week supervising these suits).
65 See David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for
Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 3-4 (1985) (developing a formal
model of nuisance suits based on the plaintiffs' ability to exploit a significant initial
cost advantage in conducting a lawsuit).
" Professor Coffee writes, "[I]t is far simpler to demand that the
defendant identify and furnish all documents, memoranda, letters and conversa-
tions conceivably pertaining to a particular subject matter over a multi-year
period than it is to comply with such a demand." See Coffee, Rethinking the Class
Action, supra note 21, at 637; see also Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 49, at 2086
(contending that the cost of litigation is higher for defendants than plaintiffs).
Under this theory, the maximum amount for which a defendant would be willing to
settle a frivolous suit equals the amount saved from not having to defend against the
suit.
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suit." Similarly, Professor Bebchuk argues that NEV suits may
bring positive returns to plaintiffs where defendants are uncertain
whether they face an NEV or positive expected value (PEV) suit for
the plaintiff.66  Because PEV suits will definitely go to trial,
settlements save defendants their full litigation-related costs. As a
result, defendants settle even NEV suits depending on the fraction
of suits that actually are NEV suits and on the litigation costs saved
from avoiding trial.
Importantly, a suit may have a negative expected value from trial
either, because the expected damages to the plaintiffs are low or
because the costs of litigation are high for the plaintiffs. As a result,
two types of NEV suits exist: those without any merit and those
where the merit is outweighed by the plaintiffs' litigation costs.
Most would agree that purely meritless NEV suits fit the common
definition of "strike suits." On the other hand, settlements of
noncost-justified, merit-based NEV suits somewhat penalize
defendants and may actually benefit social welfare to the extent the
settlement payments track the level of merit in the NEV suits. In
the Shavell and Rosenberg and the Bebchuk models, however,
settlement amounts depend primarily on the costs of litigation.
67
Therefore, the deterrence aspect of meritorious NEV suits does not
directly relate to merit and may result in more social loss through
overdeterrence than the underdeterrence loss which would result
from banning NEV suits. This Article, therefore, treats all NEV
suits as strike suits.68 The Rosenberg and Shavell and the Bebchuk
models predict that the incidence of NEV suits does not turn on the
merits of a particular case, but rather on the costs of litigation and
on the degree of uncertainty defendants have in distinguishing NEV
65 See Rosenberg & Shavell, supra note 63, at 3-4.
"See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J.
LEGAL STUD. 437, 437-41 (1988); Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the
Settlement of Litigation, 10 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 3, 5 (1990). See generally Robert
D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their
Resolution, 27J. ECON. Lrr. 1067, 1075-82 (1989) (providing a summary of settlement
theories).
"' In Bebchuk's model, the amount NEV suit plaintiffs receive depends not only
on the litigation costs, but also on the proportion of NEV suits in the population of
potential suits facing defendants. The higher the proportion of NEV suits, the lower
the amount for which defendants are willing to settle. See Bebchuk, supra note 66,
at 446-47.
' Furthermore, to the extent NEV suits bring positive returns to plaintiffs (and
their attorneys), plaintiffs with completely meritless actions will have an incentive to
increase the number of suits they file. In equilibrium, therefore, the proportion of
meritless suits will rise.
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from PEV suits.69 Several of this Article's tests, therefore, focus on
whether merit drives the incidence of suits.
In the initial public offering context, Alexander has developed
her own particular form of the strike-suit theory, arguing that strong
incentives for both defendants and plaintiffs to settle an IPO
securities class-action suit weaken the relationship between
settlement amounts and the merits.7" She claims that defendants
strongly desire to settle and avoid trial for several reasons. Given
the substantial downside risk of judgment at trial (due to the
extremely large potential damages awards common in IPO suits),
directors and officers of the issuer do not wish to go to trial.7
Moreover, defendants concerned about their reputation in the
public offerings market may desire to avoid the negative publicity
accompanying a trial.72 Defendants may also prefer a settlement
because the issuer's directors and officers often have liability
insurance policies or because the issuer indemnifies directors and
officers for any securities settlement they make. 73  Insurance or
69 It is possible to modify Bebchuk's model to make the merits matter to some
extent even for NEV cases. Defendants may possess some level of information on the
merits of a particular suit. This, in turn, may allow the defendants to make a more
accurate assessment (through Bayesian updating) of the likelihood that the suit they
face is merit based. For example, where the defendant knows that it committed gross
securities fraud and can observe large stock price declines in the market resulting
from this fraud, the defendant will believe that many cases against it are indeed PEV
suits. Likewise, where the defendant knows that it committed no fraud, it will assess
cases against it as mostly NEV suits. This assessment, in turn, will affect the amount,
if any, defendants are willing to pay for NEV suits. To the extent NEV suits exist on
a range, the NEV suits with higher levels of defendant-observable merit will receive
higher amounts of settlements from defendants. Because this Article only tests for
whether merit drives suits or not, these types of NEV suits are not distinguished.
"' See Alexander, supra note 12, at 504-07, 524-68. Note that in most standard
models of settlement, the expected merits of the case at trial do effect the settlement
amount. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection ofDisputesforLitigation,
13J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1984).
7' This is an area of potential managerial moral hazard. Although it may be in the
best interests of the issuing firm to go to trial and seek a judicial ruling, risk-averse
officers and directors who control the firm may instead force the firm to settle. See
Alexander, supra note 12, at 529-30.
' See id. at 532. Those concerned include the underwriters, accountants, and
attorneys involved in the offering. This incentive applies especially to underwriters,
who as repeat players in the initial public offering marketplace place a higher value
on their reputation in the market than other IPO participants. But see id. at 558-60
(arguing that underwriters adopt a tough no-settlement stance to protect themselves
against settlement awards by other defendants).
"' Ninety-four percent of public companies with greater than 500 shareholders
carry some form of directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance). D&O
insurance is a factor in approximately 80% of shareholder litigation. Approximately
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indemnification provisions, in addition, often do not allow reim-
bursement to directors or officers after judgment at trial where
culpability is found.74 Insurers will tend not to contest the settle-
ment because refusal may result in a claim against them for bad-
faith refusal to settle; such a claim, if successful, would make the
insurer liable for the entire amount of any eventual judgment
regardless of the policy limits. 5 Plaintiffs also have strong incen-
tives to settle and avoid trial. First, plaintiffs and their attorneys
may be risk averse.76  Second, in practice, plaintiffs' attorneys
control the plaintiff class." Class members and their representa-
50% to 80% of the settlement money in shareholder litigation comes from D&O
insurance. See id. at 550. D&O insurance policies typically include a provision
excluding liability arising from securities offerings. IPO plaintiffs can get around this
exclusion by including claims for damages to aftermarket purchasers; such claims are
not subject to this standard exclusion. See id. at 551. Note that specific Securities Act
insurance is sometimes available at a higher premium for issuers of public equity.
Like D&O insurance policies, such policies usually contain an exclusion for dishonesty
or "actual or willful intent to defraud." Id. at 554 n.231.
" After an unfavorablejudgment, D&O insurers will often claim insurance fraud
against the defendants, arguing that the defendants obtained the policy under fraudu-
lent pretenses; in such situations, insurers will refuse to pay the insurance claim. See
id. at 550-52; see also Romano, supra note 29, at 57 (arguing that "differential
indemnification rights, insurance policy exclusions, and plaintiffs' counsel as the real
party-in-interest create powerful incentives for settlement").
75 See CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h)(5) (West 1989) (stating that insurers must
"attempt[] in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlements of claims
in which liability has become reasonably clear"); see also David W. Ichel, Directors' and
Officers' Insurance Coverage: An Overview and Current Problems, in DIRECTORS' AND
OFFICERS' LIABILITY INSURANCE AND SELF INSURANCE 29,44-45 (PLI Commercial Law
& Practice Course Handbook Series No. 381, 1986) (stating that insurers are generally
obligated to defend an action or contribute to a defense unless the complaint is
"patently groundless"); David B. Parker & Linda Hulse Vitlin, The Role of Liability
Insurance in Securities Litigation, in 1 SECURITIES LITIGATION, supra note 18, at 373,
375-76 (explaining the situations in which an insurer would not have to cover the
liability of a corporation or corporate director).
" See Alexander, supra note 12, at 535-48 (explaining that plaintiffs' attorneys'
desires to settle stem from their risk aversion); Lazos, supra note 21, at 313-15 (stating
that both plaintiffs and attorneys have a motivation to settle to avoid the risk of
bearing the high costs of trial). But see Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion, supra note
21, at 18-19 (arguing that as repeat players, plaintiffs' attorneys are more likely to be
risk neutral than defendants).
" See Coffee, Rethinking the Class Action, supra note 21, at 627 ("Today, most
observers would probably concede that some litigation contexts-most notably,
derivative, securities, and antitrust litigation-are ones in which the plaintiff's attorney
functions in such an 'entrepreneurial' mode .... ."); Macey & Miller, supra note 18,
at 3 ("[P]laintiffs' class and derivative attorneys function essentially as entrepreneurs
who bear a substantial amount of the litigation risk and exercise nearly plenary
control over all important decisions in the lawsuit.").
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tives are too numerous and individually have too few incentives to
oppose the wishes of plaintiffs' attorneys. While theoretically courts
must review and authorize any class-action settlement, in practice
courts almost always grant their approval. 8 Plaintiffs' attorneys
may settle even when doing so is not in their clients' best interests
because the plaintiffs' attorneys are risk averse, the cost of going to
trial is prohibitively high,7 9 or the defendant offers a large attorney
fee award as part of the settlement.
8 0
All these factors lead Alexander to a hypothesis different from
that of either Rosenberg and Shavell or Bebchuk:8 ' Alexander
claims not only that the incidence of litigation is unrelated to
merits, but she also claims that settlement amounts turn on the level
of potential damages rather than on the defendants' costs of litiga-
tion. 2 To test her hypothesis, Alexander looked at all computer
Alexander notes that securities plaintiffs' attorneys are typically compensated
under a "lodestar" arrangement which gives the attorneys a fee equal to the number
of hours they work times a reasonable or customary wage. See Alexander, supra note
12, at 538. Because most of the attorneys' hours are put in pretrial and because trial
puts the attorneys at risk of receiving nothing for their investment, plaintiffs'
attorneys have a large incentive to settle in the securities area. See id. at 538-45; see
also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,433 (1983) (recognizing the lodestar formula
as the prevailing method for determining fee awards in contingency fee cases); Macey
& Miller, supra note 18, at 22-27 & n.63 (noting that plaintiffs' attorneys compensated
under a lodestar contingency fee arrangement will have an incentive "to settle for a
relatively low sum on the eve of trial, knowing that in so doing they obtain most of
the benefits they can expect from the litigation while eliminating their downside
risk"). Some courts recently have shifted toward the "percentage" method of
contingency fees (where the plaintiffs' attorneys are paid a percentage of the settle-
ment or liability amount). See In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 689 (N.D. Cal.
1990) (noting that the lodestar approach is "now thoroughly discredited by
experience").
7' See Lawrence M. Grosberg, Class Actions and Client-Centered Decisionmaking, 40
SYRACUSE L. REv. 709, 739 (1989) ("[M]ost class settlements get approved with little
objection and generally littlejudicial involvement.");Judith Resnick,Judging Consent,
1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43, 101 ("[J]udges are ill-equipped to do much other than nod
when the litigants join together and seek court approval.").
Going to trial presents plaintiffs' attorneys with quantitatively and qualitatively
different costs than pretrial activity. Trial work involves significantly more emotional
stress and preparation than pretrial work.
o As part of the settlement, defendants will often agree not to contest the
plaintiffs' attorneys' "lodestar" contingency fee award. See supra note 77; see also
Romano, supra note 29, at 57 (noting that plaintiffs' attorneys have a powerful
incentive to settle shareholder suits to guarantee their attorneys' fees).
" The Rosenberg and Shavell and the Bebchuk models simply posit that settle-
ments depend on the costs of litigation.
' See Alexander, supra note 12, at 501-05, 517-19, 545-48. Alexander argues that
defendant risk aversion will lead them to accept almost any settlement. Plaintiffs'
attorneys, on the other hand, will not pursue settlements above the "going rate"
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and computer-related IPOs that went public during the first half of
1983, finding that all the IPOs in her sample (nine out of seventeen)
that experienced a large enough loss in value (an aftermarket loss
in excess of twenty million dollars) were sued. These suits eventual-
ly settled for approximately the same percentage of the decline in
overall market value (roughly twenty-five percent of the potential
damages award)."3 Assuming that settlements would be for twenty
percent of the decline in IPO stock value and that contingency fees
would be for twenty-five to thirty percent of the award, Alexander
calculated that plaintiffs' attorneys filed suit when their expected fee
reached $1.25 million and above. 4 Alexander concluded that
because the merits of the settled suits were unlikely to be the same
and because all the suits settled for the same percentage of the
potential damages award, merit did not constitute a factor in these
settlements.
8 5
Alexander's empirical work, however, is unconvincing for two
reasons. First, her sample of seventeen IPOs is too small to make
inferences at any reasonable level of statistical significance. 6 Our
sample of 3519 IPOs attempts to remedy this defect in Alexander's
work. Second, she selected only computer-related IPOs, which
represent a biased cross-section of all the IPOs. As discussed below,
computer-related IPOs, in fact, belong to the industry group
(Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code 357) that experienced
the highest rate of securities class-action suits. s7 For our purposes,
we'do not directly test Alexander's hypothesis on the settlement
amounts in securities litigation, although we do provide some
evidence in support of her theory; rather, our tests focus on
whether merit drives the filing of suit.
because it allows them to maintain "larger portfolio[s] of cases that settle for a
uniform rate" and eases settlement negotiations. See id. at 547.
83 See id. at 513 n.46.
' See id.
s See id. at 522-23.
See Seligman, supra note 18, at 453 (criticizing the small sample size of
Alexander's study).
17 Weiss and Beckerman also criticize Alexander's results, arguing that if the
potential damages awards are reduced by the amount of damages the defendant could
argue resulted from other factors (for example, a general decline in the industry stock
index), then Alexander's result that the settlement amount was for a constant propor-
tion of the potential damages award would disappear. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra
note 49, at 2080-84.
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B. The Enforcement Theory
Securities-fraud class actions, on the other hand, may serve a
vital role in policing fraud in the securities markets.8 8 Proponents
of fraud liability claim that securities class actions benefit both
investors and the capital markets. Because private litigation
provides protection, investors can invest with more confidence.
Small investors in particular benefit because, although they depend
heavily on the information company management provides, they
lack the experience and sophistication to detect and filter out
misleading corporate disclosures.8 9  Larger, more sophisticated
investors, however, often possess alternative sources of information
on investment prospects and can therefore make better educated
decisions.
Fraud liability benefits capital markets to the extent investment
funds shift to their highest value use. Reliance on misleading
disclosure may cause some funds to shift toward companies whose
true investment value is lower than that of other, more truthful
companies. By reducing the amount of misleading disclosure,
therefore, fraud liability results in a more efficient allocation of
financial capital.9"
The benefits of fraud liability depend on securities-fraud actions
actually playing an enforcement role.9 ' Under the enforcement
8 See supra note 18 (citing proponents of securities class actions).
"This is particularly true in the IPO context because no secondary market trading
mechanisms exist to transmit the knowledge held by sophisticated investors to the
market as a whole.
o Certainly, some level of misleading disclosure exists in the securities market.
Outside the IPO context, the New York Times reported a widespread practice of
companies falsifying corporate data. See Diana B. Henriques, Business Fraud of the
90's: Falsifying Corporate Data, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1992, at Al ("[In the last year
alone, at least 20 public companies traded on national stock exchanges have come
forward to disclose serious lapses in their past financial statements ranging from
inflated sales and hidden ownership to the possibility of outright embezzlement.");
see also Beware of False Profits: The Temptation to Misstate Revenues Snags Young Firms,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 1, 1994, at 29 (reporting that young, publicly held companies
are more commonly "report[ing] sales of products or services that aren't completely
sold-gambling that the transaction will be completed before the deception is detected
or that another sale or contract with some upfront cash will cover the revenue
shortfall").
9 Anecdotal evidence exists that some suits are merit driven. In the Crazy Eddie
case, for example, securities-fraud litigation helped reveal misleading disclosures,
which led to criminal charges against the company's founder, Eddie Antar. See In re
Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 824 F. Supp. 320, 322 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). Plaintiffs' attorneys
in that case also assisted the government by locating and recovering assets Antar hid.
See id. at 326.
FRAUD IN THE NEW-ISSUES MARKET
theory, circumstances specific to each particular case determine
the damages award or settlement amount under section 11 and Rule
10b-5.92 Plaintiffs are more likely to succeed in cases, for example,
where the issuer or underwriter blatantly introduces false projec-
tions in the registration statement than in cases involving alleged
omissions where the defendants both lack scienter and conduct the
IPO with due diligence. By carefully incorporating all relevant
data and details into the registration statement and diligently
researching the validity and accuracy of all statements, issuers and
their agents should theoretically be able to protect themselves fully
against legal liability. Legal liability, therefore, gives issuers an
incentive ex ante93 to ensure that they make no material misstate-
ments or omissions in the IPO registration statement or related
communications.94
Not surprisingly, plaintiffs' attorney William S. Lerach has
argued that plaintiffs' attorneys must invest substantial amounts of
effort in examining the merits of a case before drafting a com-
plaint. 5 Such a process requires substantial care due to the large
' Several commentators have written on how the merits at trial affect the settle-
ment amount for PEV suits. See William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the
Courts, 14J.L. & ECON. 61, 66-69 (1971) (analyzing empirically the likelihood of trial
versus settlement in the criminal context); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2J. LEGAL STUD.
399, 417-29 (1973); Steven Shavell, Sui4 Settlemen4 and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis
Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 63-69
(1982) (analyzing under four cost-allocation systems the likelihood of trial or
settlement).
9 Throughout this Article, "ex ante" refers to the time preoffering. "Ex post"
refers to the time period after investors learn that a securities class action has been
or will be filed against a particular IPO issuing team.
See Private Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs, 103d
Cong., lst Sess. 141,145 (1993) (testimony of William S. Lerach) (arguing that private
enforcement "is an essential supplement to Government enforcement of the securities
laws, particularly in an era of deregulation and shrinking budgets"); see also Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d 155, 168 (1st Cir. 1983)
("[A]n investor.., who brings an action under the securities laws serves the public
interest by policing the securities market."), affd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
" See Lerach, supra note 18, at 90-99 (discussing the evaluation and investigation
process by which a plaintiffs' attorney should approach a potential securities case).
Macey and Miller also argue that strike suits do not comprise a large portion of fraud
class actions. See Macey & Miller, supra note 18, at 78 ("Most observers agree that
strike-suit litigation is relatively uncommon."). They contend that repeat-player
defendants will not settle to avoid developing a "reputation as an easy mark" for
frivolous litigation. See id. Similarly, plaintiffs' attorneys are unlikely to invest the
substantial amount of money it takes to conduct a complex class action where the suit
1996)
926 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 144: 903
up-front costs plaintiffs' attorneys incur in pursuing a securities case
on a contingent-fee basis. Lerach points out that because plaintiffs'
attorneys must obtain court approval before they may drop items
from a complaint, it serves their interests to examine the merits of
the case thoroughly before filing. 6 The "good faith" requirement
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 gives plaintiffs' attorneys an
additional incentive to investigate the merits of a case prior to filing
a complaint."7  Moreover, a carelessly drafted complaint can
jeopardize the chances that the court will certify the plaintiff class.
Drafting a complaint that accurately reflects the source of the
misstatements in the prospectus will ultimately reduce the amount
of motions plaintiffs' attorneys must prepare after filing the
complaint. According to the enforcement theory, therefore,
plaintiffs' attorneys primarily file merit-based securities-fraud claims.
II. SAMPLE SELECTION METHODOLOGY AND DATA DESCRIPTION
Our sample consists of 3519 initial public offerings of equity or
limited-partnership units betweenJanuary 1975 and December 1986.
Professor Jay Ritter provided the data for the period between
January 1975 and December 1984.8 We obtained data on offer-
ings between January 1985 and December 1986 from Going Public:
The IPO Reporter9 and the Security Data Company's Mergers and
Corporate Transactions database.'0 0  We exclude real estate
investment trusts,10 1 mutual funds,0 2 banks, thrifts, and their
is frivolous because of the high probability of no return for this investment. See id.
("The true strike suit, where it occurs, is unlikely to be overly costly for defendants
because the plaintiff would be likely to settle at a very low figure.").
96See id. at 91.
"' See id. at 93-94; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (requiring attorneys to file court
papers in good faith).
" This data was obtained directly from ProfessorJay Ritter, University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign.
99 See 9-10 GOING PUBLIC: THE IPO REPORTER (1985-1986).
100 Mergers and Corporate Transactions Database, Security Data Co., Newark, NJ.
(Jan. 1985-Dec. 1986). The database is now known as SDC Worldwide Mergers and
Acquisitions.
... Form S-11 is designed specifically for registration of securities that real estate
investment trusts issue. It requires special disclosure regarding certain investment
policies of the registrant. See Securities Act Form S-11, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
'7233 (June 7, 1995). See generally 3A Sec. & Fed. Corp. L. Rep. (Clark Boardman)
7-54.7 to -54.8 (1993) (describing the general disclosure requirements for real estate
investment trusts).
102 The Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8 (1994), supplements
the existing disclosure requirements in the Securities Act for mutual funds. See
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respective holding companies03 because these institutions are
subject to different disclosure requirements under the securities
laws. The sample contains almost all firm-commitment offerings in
the period from 1975 to 1986 and a large number of the best-efforts
offerings undertaken between 1975 and 1985.04
To determine which firms faced class-action lawsuits, we
examined annual disclosure forms (Form 10-K) filed with the SEC
by each firm for the four-year period following the initial offering
date.'0 5 The securities laws require reporting firms to disclose
all material legal proceedings-including shareholder litigation-in
each 10-K.' In the event that 10-Ks were not available for a
Thomas P. Lemke & Gerald T. Lins, Private Investment Companies UnderSection 3(c)(1)
of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 44 Bus. LAW. 401, 401 (1989) (noting that
before disclosure requirements of the Investment Company Act, "investment
companies were particularly prone to manipulation, self-dealing and other mis-
feasance" because of the liquid nature of their assets). The Investment Company Act
of 1940 has a registration statement for open-end management companies (e.g.,
mutual funds)-Form N-1A. See Investment Company Act of 1940 Form N-1A, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 51,201 (Sept. 20, 1995).
" Banks and thrifts are exempt from the registration and reporting requirements,
but not the antifraud provisions, of the Securities Act. See Securities Act § 3, 15
U.S.C. § 77c (1994); see also LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 46, at 218-21, 272-73.
104 The Ritter data set contains most firm-commitment and best-efforts
IPOs undertaken on major exchanges between 1975 and 1984. The IPO Reporter
listed both firm-commitment and best-efforts offerings for 1985 but only firm-
commitment offerings in 1986. Mergers and Corporate Transactions listed only firm-
commitment IPOs. Thus, our sample includes almost all significant offerings of
either type between 1975 and 1985 and almost all firm-commitment offerings made
in 1986.
105 Issuers listed on a national exchange and issuers with greater than $1 million
in assets and with at least 500 shareholders in a given class of equity must make
periodic reports to the SEC. See Exchange Act §§ 12, 13, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781, 78m
(1994). Also, all IPO issuers must make the same periodic reports for at least their
first fiscal year after the offering and each subsequent year where the number of
shareholders in any given class remains above 300. See Exchange Act § 15(d), 15
U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1994).
" See Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (1995) (requiring issuers to include
"any material pending legal proceedings, other than ordinary routine litigation
incidental to the business, to which the registrant or any of its subsidiaries is a party
or of which any of their property is the subject"). The issuer is not, however, obliged
to disclose litigation for a claim of damages where the amount involved, exclusive of
interest and costs, does not exceed 10% of the current assets of the registrant and its
subsidiaries on a consolidated basis. See Regulation S-K Instructions to Item 103, 17
C.F.R. § 229.103. Furthermore, Instruction 4 to Item 103 provides:
Any material proceedings to which any director, officer or affiliate of the
registrant, any owner of record or beneficially of more than five percent of
any class of voting securities of the registrant, or any associate of any such
director, officer, affiliate of the registrant, or security holder is a party
1996]
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minimum of four years following the IPO or where there existed a
gap of eighteen months or greater between 10-K filing dates, we
searched published news reports and court documents on LEXIS-
NEXIS and Westlaw for accounts of litigation involving the firm.
We gathered information on the outcome of each lawsuit from
published news reports and court documents on LEXIS-NEXIS,
Westlaw, and from the Class Action Reporter.l"7 To the extent our
search procedure failed to uncover all the securities class actions
related to our sample of IPOs, our sample is biased. However, the
missing data most likely derive from the smaller-magnitude, lesser-
known suits-suits too insignificant for firms to include in their
10-Ks and too small for newspapers or courts to report. Therefore,
to the extent our sample manifests bias, it overweighs the impor-
tance of the larger IPO suits. Because the real importance of
securities class actions depends on the dollar-magnitude impact on
incentives of issuers and of investors ex ante, however, losing
smaller-sized IPO suit data points should not affect the impact of
our findings.
This Part presents several summary statistics on the IPO sample
and the resulting implications for the importance of securities class
actions, plaintiffs' attorneys' incentives, and the overall level of
private enforcement.
A. Summary Statistics
This Section presents the following summary statistics for the
IPO sample: (1) IPO and suit incidence by year; (2) resolution time
period and disposition of suits; (3) offering amount distribution
within the entire lawsuit IPO samples; (4) aftermarket losses of
lawsuit IPOs; and (5) Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code
distribution of the entire and lawsuit samples.
adverse to the registrant or any of its subsidiaries or has a material interest
adverse to the registrant or any of its subsidiaries also shall be described.
Id. To the extent that a class action brought by over five percent of the shareholders
counts as an action by a beneficial owner, the company must disclose the action
under Item 103. See generally 2 Louis Loss &JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIEs REGULA-
TION 648-62 (3d ed. 1989) (describing the requirements of Item 103).
107 12-15 CLASs ACTION REP. (1982-1992). Our search also involved the
examination of numerous articles discussing litigation in the new-issues market. We
encountered references to only two firms, both traded on pink sheets, experiencing
lawsuits that were not in our sample.
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1. IPO and Suit Incidence
In the entire sample of 3519 IPOs, 123 of the IPOs, or about
3.5% of the sample, resulted in class-action suits. Section 11 and
Rule 10b-5 actions were the predominant causes of action in these
suits. The suits ranged geographically among the State of Delaware
Chancery Court and thirty different federal district courts. The
four federal courts with the largest numbers of suits were the
Southern District of New York (twenty-three suits), the Northern
District of California (seventeen suits),"'8 the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania (ten suits), and the Central District of California (nine
suits). Of the 123 IPOs which experienced a securities class-action
suit in the sample, we had data on the suit-filing date for 103. The
mean time period between the IPO offering date and the filing of
the securities class-action suit (the "FILETIME") was 566.5 days or
about 1.6 years. With a minimum of ninety days and a maximum
of 1526 days (about 4.2 years), the standard deviation of the
FILETIME was 352.7 days. 9
A breakdown of the sample by year of offering and type of
underwriting contract appears in Table 2.1.
" Eight of Alexander's nine IPO securities class actions were in the Northern
District of California. See Alexander, supra note 12, at 521.
" The following table shows the incidence of IPO suits by FILETIME intervals:
FILETIME Interval (Years) IPO Lawsuits
0 up to 0.5 11
0.5 up to 1 28
1 up to 1.5 17
1.5 up to 2 18
2 up to 2.5 11
2.5 up to 3 9
3 and greater 9
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TABLE 2.1: Initial Public Offering Sample By Year and
Type of Underwriting Contract
Year Best Efforts Firm Commitments Lawsuit Firms
1975 2 11 0
1976 3 30 4
1977 12 23 0
1978 22 28 1
1979 29 50 1
1980 108 127 7
1981 119 329 10
1982 95 115 10
1983 201 615 39
1984 193 308 13
1985 174 321 14
1986 0 604 24
Total 958 2561 123
Table 2.1 indicates that in the late 1970s, suits arising out of
initial public offerings constituted a negligible fraction of the total
number of suits in our sample. Suits involving initial public
offerings rose precipitously in the early 1980s. The data, neverthe-
less, show that only a modest number of the total IPOs ever
experienced a securities-fraud suit; IPOs which experienced a
securities-fraud suit were the exception rather than the rule.
110
2. Resolution Time Period and
Suit Disposition
The vast majority of the IPO class-action suits eventually settled
(ninety-six out of the 123 suits). Seven class-action suits resulted in
"0 Professor Romano made a similar finding in her study of derivative and
securities suits. In her sample of 535 tracked public corporations, she found that 99
firms (19%) experienced a shareholder suit for a litigation frequency of one
shareholder suit every 48 years. See Romano, supra note 29, at 59.
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a pretrial resolution in favor of the IPO defendants (dismissal,
denial of class certification, or summary judgment for the defen-
dant). Three class-action IPOs ended in a trial verdict for the
defendant; only one class-action IPO ended in a trial verdict for the
plaintiff. Five of the class-action IPOs resulted in bankruptcy. The
study failed to ascertain (due to unavailability of information) the
resolution of the remaining eleven IPOs. Table 2.2 contains the
result.
TABLE 2.2: IPO Securities-Fraud Class-Action Resolutions
Type of Resolution Number of Cases
Settlement 96
Pretrial Termination* 7
Defendant Prevails at Trial 3
Plaintiff Prevails at Trial 1
Issuer Bankruptcy 5
Unknown 11
Includes dismissals, denial of class certification, and summary judgment for the
defendant.
Of the 123 class actions, we determined the time interval
between the filing of the securities class-action suit and the
resolution of the suit (the RESTIME) for seventy IPOs. For
settlements, we used the court order date first approving the
settlement to calculate the RESTIME date. In cases where the court
order date was unavailable, we relied upon the first public
announcement date of the settlement instead. The mean RESTIME
period was 1037.8 days or about 2.84 years. With a minimum of
154 days and a maximum of 2719 days (or about 7.45 years), the
RESTIME's standard deviation was 538.3 days (or about 1.47 years).
Looking at Table 2.3, the number of suits that reached resolution
peaked in the 1.5- to 2-year period after the filing of suit (thirteen
resolutions).
1996]
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TABLE 2.3: Time from Filing Date to Resolution of the Suit
RESTIME Interval (vears) Number of Suits
less than 0.5 1
0.5 up to 1 5
1 up to 1.5 6
1.5 up to 2 13
2 up to 2.5 7
2.5 up to 3 8
3 up to 3.5 8
3.5 up to 4 6
4 up to 4.5 5
4.5 up to 5 6
5 up to 5.5 2
5.5 up to 6 1
6 and greater 2
To examine whether defendants may settle to bring finality to
an impending securities class action and save themselves the time
and expense of litigating toward trial, we divided the sample into
those IPO suits that (a) encountered some sort of nonsettlement
pretrial termination, (b) settled, and (c) ended in a trial verdict. We
present the mean RESTIMEs for each in Table 2.4.
TABLE 2.4: IPO Suit Mean RESTIME By Type of Resolution
Type of Resolution RESTIME (Days) RESTIME (Years)
Pretrial Termination* 963 2.6
Settlement 1021 2.8
Trial Verdict 1213 3.3
Includes dismissals, denial of class certification, and summary judgment for the
defendant.
These results indicate that settlement on average saves defen-
dants almost six months worth of litigation costs, but they are
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nonetheless not settled quickly. Furthermore, because trial tends to
impose much greater litigation and reputation costs on defendants,
these results may understate the savings to defendants from
settlement. Surprisingly, the data also show that even those class
actions that are eventually dismissed or otherwise end prior to trial
without settlement also take a significant amount of time. Due to
the small numbers of class actions that did not end in settlement,
however, these results lack statistical significance.
Of all the IPO suits in the sample, Jiffy Lube International took
the shortest amount of time to settle, reaching a court-approved
partial settlement agreement in under six months."' A drive-
through automobile service chain (specializing in quick oil changes),
Jiffy Lube went public in 1986. Three years later, Jiffy Lube faced
several class-action suits."' These suits alleged that Jiffy Lube's
prospectus and registration statement contained, inter alia, material
misstatements and omissions "concerning IJiffy Lube's] .. . assets,
earnings, and prospects."" 3 Importantly, at the time of the suits,
Jiffy Lube was involved in debt-restructuring negotiations with
Pennzoil Co., which the class actions threatened to disrupt."4
Plaintiffs filed the class actions againstjiffy Lube on or afterJuly 30,
1989, four days after Pennzoil announced a preliminary debt-
restructuring deal-contingent for a sixty-day implementation
period"-with Jiffy Lube. 116  Some evidence exists that the
m The named defendants includedJiffy Lube, Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,
Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., Ernst & Young, and a variety of individual defendants. All
but Ernst & Young chose to participate in the partial settlement. SeeJiffy Lube Sec.
Litig., [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,859, at 94,659 (D.
Md. Jan. 2, 1990) (discussing a settlement proposal totalling $9.5 million and
demonstrating that defendants raised their initial settlement offer dramatically once
the threat of restructuring emerged), vacated and remanded, In reJiffy Lube Sec. Litig.,
927 F.2d 155 (4th Cir 1991).
112 These suits were eventually consolidated in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Maryland. Seefiffy Lube, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) at 94,657-58.
1J3iffy Lube, 927 F.2d at 157.
114 See Jiffy Lube Pact Is Delayed, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 1989, at A2 (quoting a
spokeswoman forJiffy Lube as saying: "Pennzoil has advised the company that it will
not close until there is a resolution [to the class-action lawsuits]").
"' During this period, the deal was contingent on gaining the approval of senior
lender committees and on the completion of complex agreements among parties as
well as applicable regulatory filings. See Jiffy Lube Announces Agreement with Creditors
and Pennzoil, PR Newswire, July 26, 1989, available in Westlaw, Wireplus database.
"6 SeeJiffy Lube, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 94,658
("Pennzoil had announced an agreement withJLI [Jiffy Lube International] whereby
they would convert certain JLI subordinated debentures into common stock
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plaintiffs obtained a much quicker and larger settlement award as
a result of the pending Pennzoil debt restructuring. The need to
close the Pennzoil deal, combined with pressure from the Pennzoil
board of directors, led Jiffy Lube to raise their initial settlement
offer of $2.5 million to $9.5 million and agree to a settlement in
principle as early as October 13, 1989-less than three months after
the filing of the securities class-action suit." 7 We did not test
whether companies in the midst of mergers, takeovers, or debt
restructuring were sued more frequently than other firms.
Plaintiffs' attorneys, however, may sue these companies because the
threat of litigation might stall or destroy such deals. To avoid this
outcome, companies may pay plaintiffs' attorneys "greenmail"
settlements to end the litigation."
8
For the eighty-one IPOs in which we learned the settlement
amount, the average settlement award was $5.3 million in 1993
dollars." 9 This ranged from a low of $7283 to a high of $44.9
million in 1993 dollars. Professor Grundfest presents an interesting
test of the merits of securities class actions. He argues that suits
which settle above the defendants' litigation costs are merit based
because defendants would not pay over their litigation costs to avoid
a frivolous lawsuit. Conversely, suits where the settlement falls
below the defendants' litigation costs may well be frivolous
suits. 120 The defendants' expected litigation costs may, however,
vary by suit. In addition, defendants may pay more than their
expected cost of litigation to rid themselves of frivolous suits that
cause great harm to their reputation or disrupt their business
prospects. Nevertheless, if we take $2 million as the cut-off amount
of the defendants' litigation expenses-an amount within the range
cited by Grundfest 21-we find in our data sample the following:
permitting Pennzoil to purchase an 80% stake inJLI."). Jiffy Lube announced the
preliminary agreement on July 26, 1989. See Jiffy Lube Announces Agreement with
Creditors and Pennzoil, supra note 115.
11 SeeJiffy Lube, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 94,660.
n We leave these tests for another article.
19 The average attorney's fees paid out were $1.97 million in 1993 dollars (39
cases); these fees represented 26.9% of the settlement award. This is consistent with
Alexander's finding that attorneys received on average 25% of the settlement amount
as their fee. See Alexander, supra note 12, at 541. The average class-action plaintiffs'
expenses paid were $290,000 in 1993 dollars (29 cases), representing 4.3% of the
settlement award.
120 See Grundfest, supra note 60, at 741-43.
121 See id. at 742.
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54.1% of the settlements were for $2 million or below and 45.9%
were for more than $2 million. Thus, according to this crude test,
at least over half the securities class-action settlements would qualify
as possible frivolous suits.
Most importantly, the data confirmed that IPO securities-fraud
suits almost always settle. Only four in the sample of 123 IPO
lawsuits ended in definite trial verdicts. Therefore, for the effect of
securities-fraud class actions on the ex ante incentives of partici-
pants in the IPO process, more significant than the merits at trial
was the impact of merits on settlement awards.
3. Offering Amount
Offering amount 122 data exist for 3290 of the 3519 IPOs in the
sample. The mean offering amount in 1993 dollars was $16.6
million. The minimum offering amount was $83,000, while the
maximum was $1.569 billion with a standard deviation of $54.5
million in 1993 dollars. Although IPOs with large offering size
make headlines, 121 the smaller IPOs predominate both in number
and in total dollar magnitude. Looking at Table 2.5, the majority
of IPOs had offering amounts under $10 million. Over ten percent
of the IPOs, in fact, had offering amounts below $2 million. The
median offering was $6.9 million in 1993 dollars; furthermore,
almost ninety percent of the sample IPOs had offering amounts
below $30 million in 1993 dollars. In terms of dollar magnitude,
offerings below $30 million in 1993 dollars accounted for fifty-two
percent of the dollar volume of IPOs in our sample. 24 Far more
important to capital formation, therefore, is the impact of the threat
of securities class actions on these smaller offerings.
Compared to the total IPO sample, the offering amount
distribution of the lawsuit IPOs was skewed considerably upward.
122 Offering amount is the offering price times the number of shares actually sold
in the offering. Most of the 229 dropped observations were removed because we
could not determine the number of shares sold in the offering.
" For example, when Netscape went public this year, it attracted considerable
attention from institutional investors to computer enthusiasts. The Wall StreetJournal
covered the offering extensively, following the first-day aftermarket price as it almost
tripled and then fell to a low which still more than doubled the initial offering price.
See Molly Baker, Technology Investors Fall Head over Heels for Their New Love: Little
Stock Called Netscape Is Lofted to the Heavens in a Frenzy of Trading, WALL ST. J., Aug.
10, 1995, at Al.
124 This result is in part driven by the presence of a few outlier IPOs with offering
amounts in the billions of dollars in our sample.
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We obtained offering amount data for 122 of the lawsuit IPOs. The
mean offering amount for the lawsuit IPOs was $39.3 million in
1993 dollars. The lawsuit IPO minimum offering amount was $1.45
million and the maximum was $217.8 million, with a standard
deviation of $47.5 million in 1993 dollars. Table 2.5 contain these
results.
TABLE 2.5: Suit Frequency By Offering Size
Interval ($ million) Number of Firms Suits Rate
less than 1.79 329 1 0.30%
1.79 to 2.96 329 2 0.61%
2.97 to 3.97 328 1 0.30%
3.98 to 5.12 330 3 0.91%
5.13 to 6.71 329 7 2.12%
6.72 to 9.27 329 10 3.04%
9.28 to 14.24 329 16 4.86%
14.25 to 21.54 329 22 6.69%
21.55 to 38.58 330 20 6.06%
38.59 to 1568.93 328 40 12.20%
All firms 3290 122 3.49%
We sorted the IPO sample by the size of the offering into ten portfolios by the
amount of money raised in the IPO. We calculated offering size intervals in 1993
dollars. We could not obtain the actual number of shares sold in the offering, and
therefore the offering amount was unavailable for 229 firms, including one firm
experiencing a lawsuit arising out of the offering process. Differences in interval size
result from multiple firms with the same offering size.
The most striking result from this summary data is that smaller
sized offerings hardly ever experience a securities-fraud suit. The
relationship between size and suit incidence is statistically significant
at the 0.5% confidence level (X2 = 120.8; probability < 0.005). Of the
329 IPOs within the less than $1.79 million bracket, only one firm-
Roltec Corporation-faced a class-action suit. Roltec went public on
October 12, 1983, with an issue price of $0.25 per share for 4
million shares. 125 The second smallest offering to experience a
15 The Roltec Corporation offering amount in 1993 dollars was $1.45 million.
FRAUD IN THE NEW-ISSUES MARKET
ence a securities-fraud class action was Cymaticolor, which went
public onJanuary 13, 1981, selling 300,000 shares at five dollars per
share.12 On June 28, 1984, the SEC charged Cymaticolor with
making false and misleading statements, including disclosing
overoptimistic reports about its "Cymaticolor process" of color
printing during its IPO and unlawfully manipulating the price of its
shares once aftermarket trading had commenced.1 21 Plaintiffs'
attorneys soon followed alleging similar charges in their own private
securities class action less than one month later. Cymaticolor
eventually settled, paying out $200,000 of which $60,000 went to
attorneys' fees.
12 8
Several experts have commented on the threat of securities class-
action suits against small companies seeking to go public.129 The
data for 1975 to 1986, however, seem to contradict this conven-
tional wisdom. Although firms such as Roltec and Cymaticolor
confronted a securities-fraud class action, the vast majority of
similarly sized IPOs did not. As discussed below, this phenomenon
is partly explained by the fact that plaintiffs' attorneys' incentives
drive the decision to file suit. Whether enforcement or strike-suit
motivated, plaintiffs' attorneys will only file suit where their
expected fee award exceeds their fixed costs of litigation. 3
4. Aftermarket Losses
To examine the relationship between aftermarket loss and suit
incidence, we partitioned the empirical IPO sample according to the
three-year aftermarket loss experienced by the IPOs. The potential
damages award that a successful securities class-action plaintiff may
Our data search failed to uncover information on the outcome of the Roltec
securities-fraud class-action litigation.
"" The Cymaticolor offering amount in 1993 dollars was $2.38 million.
121 See SEC Says Cymaticolor, 2 Officers, 5 Others Manipulated Stock, WALL ST.J.,June
28, 1984, at 2.
128 Cymaticolor last traded at one cent per share on January 1990. Today, no
liquid market for its shares exists. See Andrew Leckey, On Personal Finance:
Investment Shoe Still Fits L.A. Gear, CHI. TIUB., Nov. 19, 1990, § 4 (Business), at 3. The
SEC suit settled in 1986 with Joel Green, the ex-president of Cymaticolor, agreeing
not to act as a director or officer of an SEC-reporting company and to pay $100,000
into a settlement fund for private plaintiffs. See SEC v. Cymaticolor Corp., No. 84
Civ. 4508, 1986 WL 73206, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. April 1, 1986).
' See Fletcher, supra note 22, at 493-99 & nn.1-4.
0 Alexander finds a similar result in her sample of 17 computer IPOs from 1983.
Of those IPOs under $20 million, no issuers experienced a securities class action. See
Alexander, supra note 12, at 510-13.
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obtain depends on this aftermarket loss measure. For example,
under section 11 the plaintiff receives the difference between the
purchase price (or the offering price, if lower) and either (1) the
value of the security at the time of the suit filing, (2) the resale price
of the security if resold prior to the suit, or (3) the resale price of
the security if resold after the filing of suit if the resale price is
higher than at the suit filing. 3 ' This study utilized the three-year
aftermarket loss because the statute of limitations for federal
securities actions runs until the three-year mark after the offering.
This methodology, however, lacks precision for three reasons. First,
prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Lampf Pleva, Lipkind,
Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson,12 Rule lOb-5 actions could, de-
pending on the relevant state statute of limitations, run shorter or
longer.'33 Second, for those IPOs which were the subjects of
lawsuits within the three-year period after the offering date (for
example, at the one-year mark), using the three-year low may in fact
incorporate any changes in the IPO stock price that occurred after
the filing of suit-changes irrelevant to the decision to file the suit.
Finally, the aftermarket loss measure may overstate the potential
damages award to the extent that the defendant can prove alterna-
tive causes for the decline in the stock price.' Nevertheless, the
three-year aftermarket loss provides a highly correlated proxy for
the maximum amount of damages available to a securities plain-
tiff."5  As such, the three-year aftermarket loss allows us to
... See Securities Act § 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1994). Defendants are able to
reduce this damage measure by showing an alternative cause for the stock price
decline. See id. In Rule lOb-5, plaintiffs receive an "out-of-pocket" fraud measure.
This typically gives the plaintiff the difference between the price they paid for the
security and the "true value" of the security at the time of purchase. The "true value"
is the value of the security had no securities-fraud violation occurred. SeeJanet C.
Alexander, The Value of Bad News in Secufities Class Actions, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1421,
1428-29 & nn.22-24 (1994). For purposes of this Article, the distinctions between
section 11 and Rule 10b-5 damages are ignored.
132 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
133 For example, prior to Lampf, the statute of limitations for Rule 10b-5 actions
in Oregon corresponded to Oregon's two-year statute of limitations for fraud claims.
See id. at 353.
" See Securities Act § 11 (e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e). Seligman criticizes several recent
securities class-action studies for not adjusting aftermarket losses to account for other
causes of the decline in the reporting company's stock price. See Seligman, supra note
18, at 450-53.
... Although Seligman's point is valid to the extent aftermarket losses are corre-
lated with the true potential damage measure, our results still show a tendency for
securities class actions to cluster at the high end of the potential damages award
distribution.
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examine differences in the distribution of the entire sample IPOs
versus the lawsuit IPOs.
The partition divides the sample into ten-million-dollar aftermar-
ket loss intervals below in Table 2.6.
TABLE 2.6: Aftermarket Losses and Suit Incidence
for IPOs from 1975-1986
CRSP Aftermarket Number of Number of IPOs Percentage of IPOs
Losses ($ million) CRSP Listed Experiencing a Experiencing a Suit
IPOs Class Action
less than 5 1619 24 1.48%
5 up to 10 374 26 6.95%
10 up to 20 205 18 8.78%
20 up to 30 92 13 14.13%
30 up to 40 32 5 15.63%
40 up to 50 15 4 26.67%
50 up to 100 29 8 27.58%
100 and greater 14 6 42.86%
We partitioned suit frequency by the level of aftermarket losses suffered by
purchasers at the time of the IPO. We calculated losses as the difference between the
offering price and the low price in the first three years after the IPO multiplied by
the number of shares offered. We adjusted the low price to account for the effect of
dividends and stock splits. We computed losses for firms with daily returns available
from the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business's Center for Research
in Securities Prices (CRSP).
We omitted firms if the first day of listing on the CRSP tape was
two or more days after the IPO or if there were five or more trading
days in the first three years with missing returns data. Firms were
analyzed through the first three years of being listed on or until the
date of delisting from CRSP. We had no way of adjusting the losses
to account for the effect of secondary offerings.
The data in Table 2.6 show that most IPOs did not suffer
aftermarket losses in excess of five million dollars. This result was
statistically significant at the 0.5% level (X2 = 183.4; probability
< 0.005). Of the 2380 IPOs for which aftermarket loss data exist,
only 761, or thirty-two percent, experienced an aftermarket loss of
greater than five million dollars in value. Similarly, class-action
incidence was more skewed toward those firms experiencing lower
levels of aftermarket losses. Of the 104 lawsuit IPOs for which
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aftermarket loss data exist, almost a quarter had less than $5 million
in aftermarket losses. On a percentage basis, however, the probabil-
ity of a class-action suit increases dramatically as the aftermarket
loss increases. IPOs that experienced an aftermarket loss of less
than five million dollars were sued only 1.48% of the time.1
6
Contrast this with IPOs experiencing an aftermarket loss of greater
than $100 million, which were sued 42.86% of the time.
The data from the partition of IPO suits by aftermarket losses
are consistent with the offering amount data in Part II.A.3 above.
Suits seem to occur more frequently as the chances increase of
plaintiffs' attorneys recovering an expected fee award larger than
their fixed costs of litigation. On the other hand, not all IPOs
within the higher aftermarket loss categories were sued and,
similarly, not all IPOs with lower aftermarket losses escaped suit.
For example, in our sample, Command Credit Corporation
experienced an aftermarket loss of $739.3 million, representing
99.9% of its IPO offering amount, and Datatrak experienced a
similarly large drop of $507 million or 92.2% of its IPO offering
amount. Yet neither Command Credit Corporation nor Datatrak
ever faced an IPO securities-fraud suit. Nevertheless, the stark
difference between the different aftermarket loss categories does
indicate that regardless of merit or strike-suit motivations, plaintiffs'
attorneys tend to focus their attention only on IPOs which promise
at least some minimum level of expected damages.
5. Standard Industry Classification Code
Looking at the summary statistics for the IPOs and class-action
suits by Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code, the data,
contained in Table 2.7, demonstrate at least a rough correlation
between the SIC codes and the rate of IPO suit filings. The two-
digit SICs with the five largest number of IPOs include: Business
Enterprises (SIC 73: 445 IPOs with eleven class-action IPOs-2.5%
incidence), Electronic & Other Electronic Equipment (SIC 36: 315
IPOs with seven class-action IPOs-2.2% incidence), Industrial
Machinery & Equipment (SIC 35: 296 IPOs with twenty-four class-
action IPOs-8.1% incidence), and Oil & Gas Extraction (SIC 13:
253 IPOs with four class-action IPOs-1.5% incidence).
136 In fact, IPOs that suffered an aftermarket loss of less than $1 million were sued
only 0.7% of the time.
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TABLE 2.7: Two-Digit SIC Code Breakdown














































































* No SIC code recorded.
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The two-digit SIC code level of generality may, however, ignore
some bunching within each two-digit SIC code category. For
example, within SIC 73 is SIC 731 (Advertising), which experienced
no IPO securities class-action suits, and SIC 737 (Computer and
Data Services), which experienced a suit incidence of 3.75%.
However, the test of differences among all three-digit SIC groups
lacks statistical power due to the small number of IPOs in many of
the three-digit SIC code categories. As a rough test, then, we
selected only those three-digit SIC codes which had over fifty IPOs.
This, in fact, may bias our results toward not finding a correlation
between SIC codes and suit incidence because one would expect the
lowest incidence of suits to occur within the SIC codes with the
lowest number of IPOs due to the fixed costs plaintiffs' attorneys
must incur to become an expert in any given industry' 3 7 It is
financially more rewarding, for example, to become an expert in the
type of risks and potential omissions in the computer industry
where there are numerous IPOs than to gain expertise in the
veterinary services industry where there was only one IPO in our
sample.
A comparison of the three-digit SIC groups containing greater
than fifty IPOs reveals a difference in suit incidence between
groups. Table 2.8 shows that the incidence levels range from a high
of ten percent (229 IPOs with twenty-three class-action IPOs) in the
Computer & Office Equipment three-digit SIC group (the same
group on which Alexander focused her empirical study)'3 8 to a low
of zero percent (ninety-one IPOs with no class-action IPOs) in the
Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas three-digit SIC group.'3 9 These
differences, furthermore, are statistically significant at the 0.5% level
(X2 = 41.1; probability < 0.005).
137 See infra part II.B.2 (discussing the incentives of plaintiffs' attorneys).
"s The trend of securities class-action suits within the high-technology computer
area continues today. See Carolyn Lochhead, Shareholder Lawsuits Defended By Lawyer
at House Hearing, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 20, 1995, at A4 (reporting that 25% of high-
technology companies had a securities class-action suit filed against them).
"S' Note, however, that because this is essentially a rough univariate comparison,
several other factors may account for this difference. For example, some SIC codes
may have experienced extremely good stock price performance, while other SIC codes
may have experienced extremely bad price performance.
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TABLE 2.8: Three-Digit SIC Code Breakdown for SIC Code Groups with
Greater than Fifty IPOs.
Suit
SIC Code IPOs Suits Incidence
131 (Crude Petroleum and Nat. Gas) 91 0 0.0%
138 (Oil and Gas Field Services) 158 4 2.5%
283 (Drugs) 87 1 1.1%
357 (Computer and Office Equipment) 229 23 10.0%
366 (Communications Equipment) 126 2 1.6%
367 (Electronic Comp. and Access) 114 3 2.6%
382 (Measuring and Controlling Devices) 71 2 2.8%
384 (Medical Instruments and Supplies) 118 4 3.4%
581 (Eating and Drinking Places) 92 4 4.3%
679 (Miscellaneous Investing) 106 1 0.9%
737 (Computer and Data Services) 240 9 3.8%
739 (Business Services) 159 2 1.3%
In particular, two SIC code groups with relatively high levels of
R&D-the computer-related and drugs SIC code groups-
experienced widely divergent levels of securities class actions. As
noted above, the computer SIC code group had a ten-percent
incidence of suits. The drugs SIC code, on the other hand, had
only a 1.1-percent incidence of suits. Out of the eighty-seven IPOs
in the drugs SIC code, only one issuer, Techamerica Group, Inc.,
experienced a suit. A developer and manufacturer of biological,
pharmaceutical, and diagnostic products primarily for the animal
health-care industry, Techamerica announced on January 8, 1982
that it faced a $9.5 million class-action suit for misstatements of fact
and omissions in its August 6, 1981 IPO prospectus. It eventually
settled two years later on May 10, 1984 for $1.3 million. High levels
of R&D normally correlate with a greater number of risk factors and
uncertainty in the IPO. Some factor either in addition to or other
than high-technology, therefore, drives the incentives of plaintiffs'
attorneys.
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B. Implications
Three implications follow from our summary statistics. First, the
number of securities class actions as a percentage of the total
number of IPOs is modest. Second, plaintiffs' attorneys' incentives
drive the initiation of securities class actions. Finally, because
private enforcement neglects smaller IPOs and IPOs in several
different SIC codes, the SEC may wish to increase public enforce-
ment efforts targeted at these deficient areas. The Sections below
discuss each of these implications in further detail.
1. Low Frequency of IPO Suits
Only 3.5% of the IPOs in our sample had ever experienced an
IPO suit. Although most issuers need not worry excessively about
facing a lawsuit, 40 this does not mean that securities-fraud class
actions do not impact the incentives of issuers ex ante. The large
amount of many securities class-action settlements ensures that all
issuers ex ante will take into account the expected cost of such suits.
For example, the average settlement amount per suit was $5.3
million in 1993 dollars. Because the incidence of suits was 3.5% and
the settlement rate was 75.6%, all IPOs in our sample ex ante faced
an expected litigation liability of $145,000 in 1993 dollars.'
Furthermore, this may understate the actual expected litigation
liability that firms in certain SIC groupings face. IPO securities
litigation, for example, placed a much greater burden on computer
IPOs.
140 William S. Lerach makes a similar claim that the number of securities-fraud
class actions has not risen dramatically. In fact, Lerach presents data that as a
proportion of volume trading and number of offerings, the frequency of securities
class actions has declined. See Lerach, supra note 14, at 14-17. Importantly, the
number of securities class actions filed does not equal the number of companies
actually sued. Often, several class actions are filed concurrently for the same cause
of action against the same company. Looking at the number of class-action filings,
therefore, overstates the number of companies experiencing such suits. See, e.g.,
Private Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. 141, 777 (1993) (statement ofJames M. Newman, Publisher & Editor, Securities
Class Action Alert) (noting that "fraud results in multiple case filings and thus increases
the number of cases filed but not necessarily the number of companies sued"); see also
John C. Coffee,Jr., Securities Class Actions: Myth, Reality and Reform, N.Y. L.J.,July 28,
1994, at 5 (arguing against the myth that there has been "an epidemic of securities
litigation").
14 Note that because this amount does not include legal defense costs, this
underestimates the expected litigation liability cost.
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In addition, under both enforcement and strike-suit theories,
parties adjust their behavior to the threat of a securities-fraud suit.
Under enforcement theories, issuers choose to release less mislead-
ing information than they would in a world without securities-fraud
liability."' Under strike-suit theories, issuers and underwriters
may choose to underprice their securities to reduce the possibility
of a frivolous securities-fraud action.143 These adjustments result
in a lower equilibrium level of securities-fraud actions; however, the
threat of a securities suit's impact through these adjustments may
be considerable. The low frequency of suits, therefore, does not
mean that securities-fraud suits are unimportant.
2. Plaintiffs' Attorneys' Incentives
The summary statistics provide some support for the argument
that plaintiffs' attorneys' incentives drive the filing of securities-
fraud class actions against IPOs. As reported above, most suits tend
to focus on IPOs with large offering sizes and which experience
large aftermarket losses. Securities plaintiffs' attorneys often face
considerable fixed costs in pursuing an IPO class-action suit-costs
that do not vary from IPO suit to IPO suit but that are incurred by
the attorneys in all such actions. Plaintiffs' attorneys, for example,
must coordinate the class action, conduct depositions, file motions,
and learn about the individual issuer company and its industry.1 44
Because such costs do not vary between different IPO suits,
plaintiffs' attorneys will choose to file suit only against those issuers
of IPOs with potential damages awards larger than the fixed costs
of pursuing a securities class action.
To the extent that plaintiffs' attorneys cannot determine the
merits of a case before investing in the fixed costs of litigation,
plaintiffs' attorneys will file suit against both culpable and non-
culpable IPO issuing teams, so long as the potential damages award
justifies the suit. This tends to support the strike-suit theory. If
plaintiffs' attorneys know of the merits before they invest the fixed
" Alternatively, issuers may disclose more information than cost-justified to avoid
litigation. See Letter from Roberta Romano, Professor of Law, Yale Law School, to
Stephen Choi 2 (Sept. 22, 1995) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Romano Letter].
'~' See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
' Alexander argues similarly that expected fees in the range of $1.25 million are
necessary to induce a plaintiffs' attorney to file suit. See Alexander, supra note 12, at
513 n.46 ("Fees in this range are necessary to support contingent-fee litigation of the
size, complexity, duration, and out-of-pocket expense involved in securities class
actions.").
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costs of litigation, however, such costs are not necessarily inconsis-
tent with the enforcement theory. Plaintiffs' attorneys may simply
file suit against those IPOs when there exists both the presence of
ex ante fraud and a large enough potential damages award at least
to cover their fixed costs. In either case, our findings indicate that
private securities suits generally ignore the smaller IPOs. Even for
adherents of the enforcement theory, this suggests that the
securities laws leave open a large vacuum unpoliced by private
plaintiffs. Public enforcement, therefore, may be needed to
encourage compliance with the securities laws among small IPO
issuers.
Similarly, the IPO issuer's industry weighs heavily in the
plaintiffs' attorneys' decision with respect to filing suit. Plaintiffs'
attorneys must expend a certain amount of one-time costs acquiring
sufficient knowledge about a particular industry to enable them to
generate a complaint listing the various risk factors and potential
omissions relevant to that particular industry. For example, while
the computer IPO issuers of the late 1980s should have foreseen the
computer price wars of the early 1990s, such information would be
irrelevant to other securities-fraud class actions and therefore
worthless for a plaintiffs' attorney uninterested in the computer
industry. Plaintiffs' attorneys may spread these fixed costs of
acquiring expertise by focusing their attention on one industry.
Furthermore, some industries may have greater numbers of IPOs
due to new products, new markets, or barriers-to-entry for estab-
lished firms. Plaintiffs' attorneys may choose to specialize in
industries with greater numbers of IPOs to increase the frequency
of suits over which they are able to spread the fixed costs of
specialization. 145
There exist several other reasons for concentrating on one
particular industry. First, defendants in certain industries may be
more prone to a securities class action and therefore represent
more "juicy" settlement targets. Consumer retail industry board
members, for example, may have more ties to other boards than
other industry board members and, therefore, have more fear about
damage to their business reputation from a public lawsuit.. Second,
certain industry groups may inherently find it much harder to
quantify risks and, therefore, may invite more fraudulent omission
145 Cf Christopher B. Barry et al., The Role of Venture Capital in the Creation of
Public Companies, 27 J. FIN. EcON. 447, 449-50, 457 (1990) (finding evidence that
venture capitalists tend to specialize in certain industries).
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claims. 4 6 Finally, should a particular law firm or underwriter prove
to be litigation prone, we would expect to see shareholder lawsuits
clustering along industry lines, because attorneys and underwriters
often develop a clientele in one industrial group. 4 These alterna-
tive reasons are consistent with the claim that plaintiffs' attorneys'
incentives drive securities class actions. Because the expected
settlement award is higher, plaintiffs' attorneys will value pursuing
litigation against defendants more vulnerable to litigation.
Furthermore, to the extent that none of the reasons depend on the
merits of the defendants' information disclosure, these alternative
reasons bolster the strike-suit hypothesis.
3. SEC Enforcement
The importance of plaintiffs' attorneys' incentives in filing a
securities-fraud class action necessarily results in gaps in the level of
private enforcement of the securities laws. Although the current
"private attorney general"'4 8 system saves public enforcement
resources,' it lacks universal coverage. Less than one percent of
IPOs experiencing aftermarket losses of less than one million dollars
were sued. 5 Of the 329 IPOs with an offering size less than
$1.79 million, only one was targeted for a class action.' Simi-
146 For example, a new pharmaceutical start-up may have a much harder time
quantifying the potential risks facing its technologically revolutionary drug products
than a new textile company employing well-known and tested manufacturing
technologies.
147 For example, underwriter A may specialize in computer IPOs. Underwriter A
may also have a reputation among securities plaintiffs' attorneys as being a pushover
in litigation. Therefore, plaintiffs' attorneys may consistently seek to sue underwriter
A and, therefore, indirectly choose to sue the computer IPOs.
"" See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d
155, 168 (1st Cir. 1983) (citing American Safety Equip. Corp. v.J.P. Maguire & Co.,
391 F.2d 821, 826 (2d Cir. 1968)), affd in part and rev'd in part, 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
149 Several commentators have written in support of private enforcement of the
securities laws. See, e.g., 5A ARNOLD S. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER
RULE 10B-5, § 8.01 (2d ed. 1992) ("Private actions are the most effective way to police
lOb-5 breaches and provide the deterrent element so essential in securities
transactions." (footnote omitted)).
"5 Note that this contradicts the conventional wisdom that strike-suit plaintiffs'
attorneys target small companies that experience relatively larger swings in their share
prices. See Brent Bowers & Udayan Gupta, Shareholder Suits Beset More Small
Companies, WALL ST.J., Mar. 9, 1994, at B1.
1 See supra part II.A.3 (reporting offering amount summary data); see also
Grundfest, supra note 60, at 734 & n.46 (noting that plaintiffs' counsel are more likely
to file claims "with greater probabilities of large recoveries" and that sharp price
declines are significant in identifying potential claims).
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larly, the Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas and Drugs SIC code
industries together had 178 IPOs but only one suit in our sample.
Although univariate summary statistics, these data provide strong
evidence that smaller sized IPOs, IPOs which experience relatively
small aftermarket losses, and IPOs in certain industry groups are
not adequately policed through the actions of plaintiffs' attor-
neys. 1 2 Regardless of whether the enforcement theory or strike-
suit theory more accurately describes the dynamics of securities-
fraud actions, entire subsections of the IPO market remain insulated
from any legal scrutiny.
Some may argue that smaller offering sized IPOs or IPOs with
relatively small aftermarket losses are so minute in magnitude that
reducing private enforcement for these IPOs will neither affect the
overall level of investor confidence in the market nor noticeably
increase the amount of fraud and misleading information in the
market. Nevertheless, the smaller IPOs and IPOs with small
aftermarket losses dominate in quantity. The majority of IPOs in
our sample are under $5 million in aftermarket losses; the majority
of IPOs are also under $10 million in offering amount. The
majority of IPO suits, however, involve IPOs with greater than $5
million in aftermarket losses and greater than $10 million in
offering amount. Most IPOs, therefore, receive relatively little
private enforcement. This lack of private enforcement may tempt
many smaller sized issuers to disclose misleading information.
Furthermore, even larger issuers or issuers in unnoticed SIC code
industries may seek to inflate the value of their offering slightly by
an amount just small enough to discourage the attention of
plaintiffs' attorneys.' 53
152 It is possible that small aftermarket losses correlate with smaller amounts of
misleading information disclosure. Therefore, the fact that companies with small
aftermarket losses are not sued may not necessarily lead to the conclusion that more
merit-based enforcement is needed against these companies. However, for companies
with low capitalization, even a small aftermarket loss may translate into a large
percentage drop in overall value. Therefore, the level of misleading disclosures for
these companies may very well be large, yet the small size of the company translates
this into only a small aftermarket loss. Furthermore, even for companies with high
capitalization, controlling even small levels of misleading information may be
important to protect investor confidence.
153 Note that our sample is possibly biased against uncovering lawsuit IPOs with
smaller dollar magnitude claims. See supra part II.A (describing the IPO data sample).
To the extent that this bias problem is significant, our contention that private
enforcement does not adequately police smaller sized offerings is weaker. Even for
the smaller sized offering IPOs, however, the dollar magnitude of the potentially
missing IPO lawsuits must be small enough to avoid disclosure within the firms' 10-K
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This underenforcement phenomenon suggests a need for
greater SEC enforcement.154 To the extent SEC enforcement
efforts are more merit based than private actions, SEC enforcement
should increase across the board. Moreover, even where private
enforcement itself is merit-driven, the SEC should still intensify its
enforcement for smaller sized IPOs, IPOs that experience only a
moderate aftermarket loss, and IPOs in SIC code groups where
plaintiffs' attorneys traditionally do not venture. This recommenda-
tion runs counter to the recent attempts in Congress to downsize
the SEC.155
III. EMPIRICAL TESTS OF THE ENFORCEMENT VERSUS
THE STRIKE-SUIT THEORIES
Unfortunately, determining whether a particular class action is
merit or strike-suit based is not as easy as asking the plaintiffs' or
defendants' attorneys on the case. Plaintiffs' attorneys will
invariably argue that the defendants' fraudulent disclosure greatly
harmed the interests of the investors. Defendants' attorneys, on the
other hand, will contend that all disclosures were truthful and
complete.'56 Similarly, simply looking at the growth rate in
securities litigation or the size of settlement awards does not answer
the question of whether suits are meritorious or frivolous. The
and annual report disclosure statements. See supra note 106 (describing disclosure
requirements for "material" litigation under Regulation S-K). Therefore, even for
these smaller sized offering IPOs, the missing suits are relatively unimportant in terms
of dollar magnitude.
'4 We do not necessarily argue for an expansion of private enforcement. Given
the likelihood that a substantial portion of private litigation is frivolous, encouraging
such litigation against small companies may result in a large amount of deterrence
against even meritorious companies. Rather, we propose an expansion of SEC
enforcement attention toward companies with smaller capitalization.
15 For example, on September 7, 1995, the Senate Appropriations Commerce
Subcommittee voted to reduce the funding of the SEC by 20%. The Subcommittee
also voted to phase out over a two-year period filing fees that the SEC uses to fund
some of its activities. See SEC: Senate Appropriations Panel Votes to Slash SEC Funding
By 20 Percent, BNA SEC. L. DAILY, Sept. 11, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File.
" Even if plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys were truthful, their adversarial role
would still affect their opinions. See Alexander, supra note 12, at 506. Furthermore,
collecting and analyzing the merits of every securities class-action IPO would take an
enormous amount of effort and would turn, in part, on the researchers' subjective
determination of the merits. See id.
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incidence of securities litigation or settlement awards may increase
either because plaintiffs' attorneys are finding strike suits more
profitable or because issuers are engaging in more fraud ex ante.
Tests distinguishing between these two explanations would sub-
stantially illuminate this area of the law.
This Part presents five tests of the enforcement versus strike-suit
theories of securities-fraud class actions. The first of these tests
examines the plaintiffs' attorneys' decision to file suit and the
factors that affect this decision. The quality of the IPO underwriter,
in particular, drives the plaintiffs' attorneys' decision. The second
test analyzes whether lawsuit IPO insiders sell off more of their
shares during the IPO than nonlawsuit IPO insiders, using the
amount of insiders' shares sold as a proxy for the ex ante merit of
the offering. The results show that insiders do not sell more shares
in a lawsuit IPO. For the third test, the preoffering corporate
governance structure of the issuer serves as an alternative proxy for
merit. The test examines whether weak, insider-dominated boards-
boards which should display a greater amount of ex ante misbehav-
ior-correlate with IPO-suit incidence. Lawsuit IPOs, in fact, do
display more insider-dominated preoffering boards. The fourth test
analyzes the factors affecting the settlement process in an IPO suit
to determine whether settlement amounts depend on merit- or
nonmerit-related factors. Settlement amounts seem to depend most
on the potential damages award with little sensitivity to merit-
related factors. Finally, the fifth test consists of an event study of
the returns and trading volume surrounding the public announce-
ment of an IPO suit filing. This final test assesses whether price
drop alone deterministically drives IPO suits. The event study
demonstrates abnormal returns and elevated trading volume,
indicating that publicly observable factors alone do not drive IPO
suits. Information unknown to the public-including possibly merit-
related factors-must also drive the decision to file suit. Although
the results of these five tests are mixed, on the whole they do
provide strong evidence that at least a significant fraction of IPO
suits are frivolous.
A. The Decision to File Suit
This Section explores the factors associated with a higher
incidence of IPO shareholder litigation. As shown in Part II.A.8,
the offering size of the IPO affects the incidence of shareholder
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litigation. Part II.A.4 highlighted that firms which experience larger
aftermarket losses tend to be targeted for securities class-action
suits. Part II.A.5 reported a wide variance in the incidence of
shareholder litigation between firms in different industries. The
results in Part II considered each factor in isolation. This Section
analyzes the combined impact of these factors on the plaintiffs'
attorneys' decision to file suit.
The factors examined include the quality of the underwriter, the
offering amount, the offering price, the ratio of R&D and advertis-
ing expenditures to sales in the IPO's industry, and whether the IPO
was conducted on a firm-commitment or best-efforts basis. The
quality rating for a particular underwriter derives from Professors
Carter and Manaster's study of underwriter quality in the IPO
setting.'57 Table 3.1 below uses a probit model to regress these
factors against the dependent variable of whether the IPO firm
experienced a securities-fraud class action.
1 58
'
57 See Richard Carter & Steven Manaster, Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter
Reputation, 45 J. FIN. 1045, 1054-56 (1990). To construct a relative ranking of
underwriter quality, Carter and Manaster examined the relative positioning of under-
writers on tombstone announcements fromJanuary 1979 to December 1983. Outside
of the managing underwriter, underwriters are placed in a series of different groups
on the tombstone ads, increasing in distance from the top of the tombstone ads;
within each group underwriters are listed alphabetically. Carter and Manaster ranked
underwriters based on their relative group positioning. In cases where underwriter
A was higher than underwriter B in one offering but was lower in another, they
assigned A and B the same ranking.
" Testing for the significance of the individual SIC codes requires the addition
of dummy variables for each SIC code in the probit model. Because almost 1000
possible three-digit SIC code dummy variables would be required to test industry
significance of the three-digit SIC code level, such a test would lack statistical
significance for our sample size. We therefore use R&D/Sales and Ads/Sales as
industry proxies rather than looking directly at SIC codes.
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TABLE 3.1: Predicting Class-Action Suits

















Significant at the * 20% level; 10% level; "* 5% level.
The probit model takes the dependent variable as one if the firm experienced a
lawsuit and zero if the firm did not experience a lawsuit. C-M RATING is the mean
Carter-Manaster rating of each IPO's underwriters. OFFERPRI is the offering price
multiplied by 100. Log(AMOUNT) is the natural log of the amount of money raised
in the offering in 1993 dollars. R&D/SALES and AD/SALES are respectively the
industry ratios of R&D expenditures to sales and advertising expenditures to sales for
the same three-digit industry as the IPO. FIRMCOM equals one if the offering was
a firm-commitment or combined firm-commitment and best-efforts offering.
Otherwise, FIRMCOM equals zero. A positive coefficient indicates that a rise in the
independent variable increases the likelihood of experiencing a class-action suit.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 3.1 demonstrates that two factors have a statistically
significant effect on the incidence of IPO securities class actions.
First, the log of the offering amount is significant at the five-percent
level. Consistent with the discussion in Part II, because plaintiffs'
attorneys must recover their fixed costs of litigation, only the
relatively larger offerings will be subject to securities class actions.
Unlike in Part II, however, the proxies for industry type are not
significant. R&D and advertising expenditures as a fraction of sales
correlate positively with the incidence of suits, but not in a
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statistically significant manner. This is not necessarily incompatible
with the theory that plaintiffs' attorneys must absorb a fixed cost to
gain expertise in a particular industry. The test for R&D and
advertising expenditures indicates that companies with relatively
high or fast-moving technologies and companies with a primarily
consumer-products base 59 tend-albeit weakly and without statisti-
cal significance-to experience more securities class actions. At any
given level of R&D or advertising expenditures, however, plaintiffs'
attorneys may specialize only in certain SIC code industries. In
other words, not all high-technology areas receive attention from
securities plaintiffs' attorneys. Although the computer industry (SIC
737) certainly experiences a large proportion of fraud suits, other
areas with high levels of R&D/Sales lack similarly high incidences
of litigation. For example, the drug manufacturing industry (SIC
283) also has a relatively high R&D/Sales ratio. Of the eighty-seven
IPOs within the drug manufacturing SIC group, only one was the
subject of a securities class action.
1 60
Second, the underwriter quality of the IPO correlates with an
increased presence of IPO suits. This result is statistically signifi-
cant only at the twenty-percent level. Nevertheless, it provides
strong evidence for the strike-suit theory because the enforcement
theory predicts that underwriter quality should correlate, if at all,
with a decreasing level of suit incidence. The higher the underwriter
quality, typically, the higher is the quality of the IPO. 16 ' Higher
quality underwriters possess reputational capital based on their well-
established merit. As a result, they draw more repeat investors
attracted by the underwriters' reputation for delivering IPOs of
relatively high quality and without potentially costily misleading
information disclosure. Underwriters reap returns on this reputa-
tional capital through higher fees charged to issuers seeking access
to the high quality underwriters' stable of repeat investors. These
underwriters seek to maintain this reputational capital through
careful screening of the potential issuers for misleading information
disclosure and fraud. Therefore, higher quality underwriters should
159These companies spend considerably more on advertising than other
companies.
'" See supra part II.A.5 (reporting distribution of class actions by SIC code). We
did not regress the SIC code of the IPOs directly because of the lack of continuity in
the SIC code variable (for example, the SIC codes are discrete).
1 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 620 (1984) ("In essence, the investment banker rents
the issuer its reputation.").
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correlate with a lower incidence of ex ante fraud: the higher the
quality of underwriters, the lower the incidence of ex post merit-
based securities-fraud suits.
1 62
Despite the reputational reasons for underwriters to screen
issues for quality, underwriter quality may nevertheless not correlate
with merit to the extent issuers attempting to mislead seek to
associate with high quality underwriters. In essence, the high
quality underwriters provide "cover" for the misleading issuers. Of
course, underwriters seeking to maintain their reputation will
attempt to stop these misleading issuers, but the underwriters may
lack the capability to detect all types of fraud. Note, however, that
at most this countereffect will result in no relationship between
underwriter quality and merit. To the extent proportionally more
misleading issuers associate with high quality underwriters, investors
with rational expectations will realize this and penalize the associat-
ed issuers, eliminating the incentive of misleading issuers to go to
high quality underwriters in the first place. The worst possible case,
therefore, is a pooling equilibrium where the underwriter quality
signals nothing about an offering's ex ante merit. In reality, under-
writers have access to most company records and are able to screen
for many types of fraud. In addition, truthful companies also gain
more through association with high quality underwriters and will
compete with misleading companies for the business of the high
quality underwriters. Therefore, misleading issuers seeking to
associate with high quality underwriters most likely reduce but do
not eliminate the relationship between high quality underwriters
and meritorious issues.
163
16 Indeed, several commentators have written on the possible incentive of
underwriters to underprice an IPO. See supra note 36. The lower the offering price,
the lower the chance that aftermarket trading will result in a price lower than the
offer price. This in turn reduces the chances of a fraud suit against the offering. See
Tiniq, supra note 36, at 800 (stating that underpricing of IPOs may protectagainst
potential legal liabilities more efficiently than using due diligence). Butsee Alexander,
supra note 36, at 20 (concluding that "[t]he lawsuit avoidance theory thus is unlikely
to account for more than a small part of the underpricing that has been observed");
Drake & Vetsuypens, supra note 30, at 64 (finding that underpricing IPOs "is not a
very efficient way of avoiding future lawsuits").
"63 Alternatively, underwriter quality may correlate with fraud to the extent
plaintiffs' attorneys base their search for fraud on extreme price changes. With
underwriters of low quality, issues tend to be more volatile in their price movements;
therefore, a large price drop may not communicate very much about the ex ante
merits of the offering. For underwriters of high quality, however, issues are less
volatile, making a large price drop more suspect and indicative of ex ante fraud.
Even merit-based plaintiffs' attorneys, therefore, may target primarily high quality
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The fact that underwriter quality in fact correlates positively with
suit incidence therefore suggests that suits are not always driven by
merit-related factors. The positive nature of the relationship
between underwriter quality and suit incidence favors instead the
strike-suit theory. Higher quality underwriters are eager to protect
their reputational capital from the damage associated with a
securities-fraud suit. Because the underwriter's reputation rests
primarily on its ability to deliver high quality issuers without
misleading information disclosure or fraud, involvement in a
securities-fraud class action is particularly harmful."6  Conse-
quently, underwriters are eager to settle securities suits swiftly
and without publicity. Plaintiffs' attorneys seeking to extort
settlement money from any IPO which suffers a large enough
aftermarket loss will realize this and actively sue the higher quality
underwriters.
Table 3.2 provides an alternative test of the relationship between
underwriter quality and suit incidence. In this alternative model, we
took underwriter quality of the IPO as the dependent variable and
regressed against the incidence of a suit, the offer price, the natural
log of the offer quantity, the R&D and advertising to sales ratio of
the IPO's industry, and the firm-commitment or best-efforts nature
of the offer.
underwriters, leading to a positive correlation between underwriter quality and merit
consistent with the enforcement theory. However, to the extent merit-based
plaintiffs' attorneys have other sources of information on fraud besides the magnitude
of the price drop, there is no necessary relationship between the incidence of suits
and high quality underwriters.
' Furthermore, the higher quality underwriters are probably more likely to carry
higher coverage liability insurance. See Romano Letter, supra note 142, at 2.
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TABLE 3.2: Underwriter Choice and Underpricing of
Lawsuit and Nonsuit Firms
Model 1 Model 2
















Adj. R2  0.582 0.586
Observations 3181 3181
Significant at the * 20% level; 10% level; "" 5% level.
In both Models I and 2, the dependent variable is the mean quality rating of the
firm's underwriters based on Carter-Manaster's rating of underwriters. SUIT equals
one if the firm experienced a class-action suit arising out of the initial offering, and
zero otherwise. OFFERPRI is the offering price multiplied by 100. Log(AMOUNT)
is the natural log of the amount of money raised in the offering in 1993 dollars.
R&D/SALES and AD/SALES is the industry ratio of R&D expenditures to sales and
advertising expenditures to sales for the same three-digit industry as the IPO.
FIRMCOM equals one if the offering was a firm-commitment or combined firm-
commitment/best-efforts offering, and zero otherwise. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
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The results in Table 3.2 exhibit a strong, statistically significant
relationship between the natural log of the offering amount and the
underwriter quality of the IPO. Higher quality underwriters tend
to associate with only the larger offerings. To the extent higher
quality underwriters provide monitoring services for their investors,
the cost of the services are more easily spread in larger offerings.
Smaller offerings cannot justify the fixed monitoring costs of the
higher quality underwriters. As with the results in Part II, this
points to a lack of private market-based control of misleading
information disclosure in smaller sized offerings.
1 65
Like Table 3.1, Table 3.2 demonstrates a positive relationship
between suit incidence and underwriter quality, weakly significant
at the twenty-percent level. The results again provide some
evidence that IPOs with underwriters of higher quality tend to
experience a greater number of securities-fraud class-action suits
and support the theory that plaintiffs' attorneys engage in strike
suits, seeking to file suit against those underwriters most vulnerable
to suits and most willing to settle quickly. At the very least, the
positive relationship between suit incidence and underwriter quality
bolsters the argument that greater levels of ex ante merit-related
characteristics do not reduce the frequency of suits.
To test further the importance of underwriter quality in the
decision to file suit, we matched the lawsuit IPOs against IPO firms
that had similar levels of aftermarket losses but that did not experi-
ence a fraud class action. We calculated aftermarket losses as the
number of shares issued at the time of the offering multiplied by
the three-year low price of these shares in aftermarket trading.
166
We based the three-year low on the University of Chicago Graduate
School of Business's Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP)
data on daily returns, adjusted for dividends and stock splits. We
matched the lawsuit IPOs and IPO firms on the basis of total dollar
losses to purchasers of the IPO and the percentage loss in value
from the offering price. We selected the matching IPO firm within
our IPO sample that had aftermarket losses most closely matched to
those of the lawsuit IPO and losses calculated as a percentage of the
165 Table 3.2 also indicates that higher quality underwriters tend to associate with
firm-commitment over best-efforts offerings. This may be because higher quality
underwriters are better capitalized and are therefore better able to purchase the
issuers securities for resale under a firm-commitment offering.
" Seesupra part II.A.4 (discussing the weaknesses of this approach in calculating
the aftermarket losses of shareholders).
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offering amount within ten percent of the lawsuit firm. Thirty-two
firms had to be omitted due to missing data or because a suitable
match was unavailable. The results appear below in Table 3.3.
TABLE 3.3: Firms Matched By Underperformance
Lawsuit Firms Matching Firms p-value*
Mean Aftermarket 17.075 16.532
Loss (millions)
Loss in 74.29% 74.66%
Aftermarket
Mean GM Rating 5.848 5.159 0.077
Mean Industry 2.34% 2.52% 0.653
R&D/Sales
Sample Size 91 91
The p-value is the value of a two-sided test of the difference in mean values between
the two samples.
The above data further supports two points. First, firms with
more R&D-high-technology firms-do not experience greater levels
of securities class actions. High-technology in and of itself does not
seem to explain the incidence of securities class actions. Although
certain sectors of the high-technology area, most notably the
computer SIC area, experience a disproportionate number of fraud
suits, this trend does not generalize to all high-technology firms.
Second, IPOs with higher quality underwriters tend to experience
more fraud suits. 167 Again, these results uphold the strike-suit
theory of class actions because higher quality underwriters tend to
associate with issuers with lower, not greater, levels of misleading
information disclosure.
B. Ex Ante Proxies for Merit
To distinguish between the enforcement and strike-suit theories,
this Section examines the IPO structure and the corporate gover-
nance of the issuers in the lawsuit sample. The enforcement theory
implies that the incidence of lawsuit IPOs will correlate with the
merit of the information disclosure during the offering.16 We use
'6 As Table 3.3 indicates, this is statistically significant at the 10% level.
'6 Naturally, IPO participants are able to observe ex ante proxies of merit at the
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two different proxies for ex ante merit. First, if insiders are
purposefully issuing misleading statements in the prospectus, we
expect that insiders in the lawsuit firms would sell a larger fraction
of their total holdings and that insider sales would constitute a
larger fraction of the total shares offered. Second, we also expect
to see governance structures in the firms experiencing a shareholder
lawsuit that are more conducive to opportunistic behavior on the
part of insiders. 69 On the other hand, the strike-suit theory
points to no relation between these proxies for ex ante merit and
securities class actions. In other words, there should be no
necessary correlation between these indirect measures of ex ante
merit and the occurrence of a frivolous securities-fraud suit.
Regardless of merit, according to the strike-suit theory, opportunis-
tic plaintiffs' attorneys sue all firms that experience enough of an
aftermarket price decline.
1 70
In order to control for variations in the likelihood of a lawsuit
arising out of different types of initial public offerings, we parti-
tioned the sample into those firms that were initially privately held
and then went public, demutualizations, offerings of limited
partnership shares, and spin-offs.' 71 The study focused solely on
firms which were initially privately held. For each firm in the
lawsuit sample, we chose a comparable firm that was also privately
held prior to the offering and went public between 1975 and 1986.
We selected the comparable firms by matching the firms' three-digit
SIC codes and sales after adjusting for inflation. All comparable
firms had sales between 25% and 400% of that of the matching
lawsuit firm. If a suitable firm was unavailable in the same three-
digit SIC category, we searched the adjacent three-digit industry
categories until we could find a suitable match. In all cases, we
inspected the business description of the prospectus summary to
ensure that the lawsuit and matching firms were indeed in compara-
time of the IPO itself. To the extent these proxies indicate the possibility of fraud,
potential purchasers of the securities will demand a lower offer price. Purchasers,
therefore, will be compensated for the risk of fraud through the offer price. These
purchasers still retain the right to initiate and pursue a securities-fraud claim.
Because such a claim partially insures the purchasers against fraud, the offer price will
not adjust as much. Furthermore, ex post, once fraud is revealed, these purchasers
will use their securities-fraud cause of action against the IPO issuing team.
169 Therefore, under the enforcement theory, the boards of directors of issuers
that experience an IPO securities class action should contain relatively few outsiders.
170 See supra part L.A (summarizing strike-suit theory).
171 We treat a spin-off as a firm in which another public corporation held 50% or
more of the shares prior to the IPO.
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ble businesses. The final sample consisted of ninety-nine pairs, or
198 transactions. We used the matching firms to control for
exogenous factors which might affect the relationship between suit
incidence and our proxies for merit. 12  The results of the
matching process appear in Table 3.4.
TABLE 3.4: Construction of the Matching Sample
123 Total Lawsuit Firms
- 13 Spin-Offs, Limited Partnerships &
Demutualizations
110 Going Public Transactions
- 6 Prospectus Unavailable
- 5 No Suitable Match
99 Matching Sample
1. Insider Sell-Off During the IPO
Insider sell-off during the IPO serves as the first proxy for ex
ante merit. Insiders of a misleading issuer realize that the shares
are overvalued and sell more to recover a windfall from this
overvaluation. In a world where only the insiders of misleading
issuers seek to sell greater numbers of shares, however, investors
should be able to notice this ex ante and price down the IPO shares
accordingly. As a result, insiders lose the incentive to sell greater
numbers of shares and insider sell-off should not correlate with suit
incidence or merit. Insiders, however, may sell greater numbers of
shares for a variety of reasons; for example, some insiders sell for
liquidity needs. Therefore, investors are not able ex ante to use
insider sell-off to discriminate perfectly between misleading and
truthful issuers. Insiders of misleading issuers, as a result, will
attempt to sell a greater number of shares, leading to some positive
correlation between insider sell-off and merit.
The insider sell-off proxy allows for a test of the dissimilarities
in the structuring of the lawsuit IPOs and their nonlawsuit counter-
1" For example, using matching pairs of firms controls for the possibility that the
industry group that the lawsuit IPO firm belongs to actually drives the incidence of
suits.
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parts. The insider sell-off proxy may be represented as either shares
sold as a fraction of shares outstanding or insider shares as a
fraction of shares sold in the IPO. The results of the matched pairs
analysis of the offering structure of the lawsuit and control IPOs
appear in Table 3.5.
TABLE 3.5: Terms of the Transaction
Lawsuit Control p-value*
Sales in 1993 Dollars (thousands) 63,225 57,357 0.643
Size of Offering in 1993 Dollars 35,149 24,734 0.039
(thousands)
Ownership of Directors and 70.7% 63.9% 0.094
Officers Before Offering
Ownership of Directors and 49.2% 45.7% 0.224
Officers After Offering
Insider Shares as a Fraction of 40.5% 42.4% 0.612
Shares Outstanding Preoffering
Insider Sales as a Fraction of 27.9% 25.8% 0.841
Shares Sold
Best-Efforts Offerings 4 7
Firm-Commitment Offerings 95 92
No Risk Factors Section 50 45
Separate Risk Factors Section 49 54
Average Number of Risk Factors 9.375 10.519 0.464
Listed if Prospectus Contains a Risk
Factors Section
Average Underwriter Rating 5.615 4.642 0.017
(Carter-Manaster)
*The p-value is the value of a two-sided test of the difference in mean values between
the two samples.
These results yield little support for the hypothesis that lawsuit
IPO insiders are more likely to use new issues to mislead the public
or bail themselves out of the issuing firm than nonlawsuit IPO
insiders. Insiders do account for a larger fraction of the total shares
sold in lawsuit IPOs than in the control nonlawsuit IPO group;
however, the difference lacks statistical significance. Conversely, as
a fraction of shares outstanding, lawsuit IPO insiders sold fewer
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shares than control IPO insiders. This result, however, is also not
statistically significant. The only significant difference between the
two groups is the size of the offering. 7 ' The significantly larger
size of the offerings of lawsuit IPOs is difficult to interpret. The
larger size of the litigated offerings could be the product of inflation
in the value of the shares due to the suppression of negative
information in the offering prospectus. On the other hand, the
larger size of lawsuit IPOs is consistent with the theory, as discussed
above in Part II, that plaintiffs' attorneys focus their attention only
on IPOs in which a suit has the potential to return an award for
attorney's fees larger than the fixed costs of litigation.174
2. Corporate Governance Structure
The second proxy for ex ante merit is the structure of the
preoffering board of directors. Under this proxy, the number of
outside board members is taken to correlate with the level of
misleading information disclosure in the offering. The lower the
fraction of outsiders on issuer boards, the less vigorously we assume
the board monitors firm behavior during the IPO. 75 The fewer the
outside board members, for example, the easier it is for insiders to
defraud the public. This relationship in turn intimates that firms
with a lower fraction of outside board members should have a
higher incidence of securities fraud in their offerings. In Table 3.6,
we compare the structures of the boards of directors of the two
samples along a number of dimensions.
17 6
1"5 In their study of securities class actions, Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper found
that lawsuit firms had statistically significant larger assets, sales, market share, number
of employees, and shares outstanding than their industry-matched control firms. See
Francis et al., supra note 32, at 11-12.
174 An alternative hypothesis is that plaintiffs' attorneys do not select cases based
on insiders' sales. See supra part II.B.2 (discussing plaintiffs' attorneys' incentives).
"7 Outsiders tend to monitor firm misbehavior more aggressively than insiders
because outsiders have more reputation at stake and stand to gain less from the illicit
gains of firm misbehavior. See, e.g., David L. White, Outside Directors Under the Federal
Securities Laws: Fraudulent Actors or Innocent Victims?, 21 SEC. REG. LJ. 297, 299
(1993).
17' The lawsuit IPO and matching IPO samples were not matched based on their
IPO date. Because the number of outside directors has generally risen over the
1980s, this may have biased our results. Most IPOs in our sample took place in the
six years from the beginning of 1981 to the end of 1986. Because most matching
firms were also pulled from these six years, the level of bias, if any, should be
minimal.
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TABLE 3.6: Governance of the Initial Public Offering
Lawsuit Control p-value*
Fraction of Seats Held By 49.4% 44.6% 0.109
Management
Fraction of Seats Held By 9.8% 10.7% 0.739
Venture Capitalists
Fraction of Seats Held By 3.7% 3.1% 0.548
Underwriters
Fraction of Seats Held By 12.1% 10.6% 0.480
Other Agents-
Fraction of Seats Held By 24.8% 30.9% 0.031
Outsiders-
Average Number of Outside 0.419 0.566 0.079
Directorships Held
Average Board Size 6.05 6.59 0.080
(Number of Seats)
"The p-value is the value of a two-sided test of the difference in mean values between
the two samples.
-Other agents include relatives of the management, founders of the firm who are
not part of the management team, individuals who have a business relationship with
the firm, and the firm's auditor or legal counsel.
"° Outsiders include all board members not associated with the management, venture
capitalists, or underwriters. In our sample, outsiders typically were comprised of
officers of unrelated corporations, professors, and other unrelated professionals.
The most striking result of the comparison between the two
samples is the weakness of the board structure of the lawsuit firms
relative to the control sample. Firms experiencing a lawsuit had a
significantly lower fraction of outsiders on their boards of directors.
Here, we defined outsiders to include all board members not
associated with management, venture capitalists, or underwriters.
Outsiders held only 24.8% of the board seats in lawsuit IPO issuers;
conversely, outsiders held 30.9% of the board seats in the control
IPO issuers. This difference was statistically significant at the five-
percent level. These results, therefore, provide support for the
theory that lawsuit firms were sued for merit-related reasons.
The lower proportion of outsiders on the board of directors of
an issuer that was eventually sued, however, does not necessarily
indicate that lawsuit IPOs in fact had more fraud than nonlawsuit
IPOs. First, the reduced presence of outsiders on the board may
not lead to more issuer malfeasance if other substitute parties who
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have a reputational stake in the success of the firm-such as
underwriters or venture capitalists-monitor the issuer instead. To
test this, we decomposed the remainder of the board into various
classes of directors. The results show that the lack of outside
directors is largely due to the predominance of management
representatives on the boards of directors177 and not due to an
increased presence of either underwriters or venture capitalists.
17
1
Table 3.6 shows that the proportion of venture capitalists on the
board was in fact less for lawsuit IPOs than for the control IPOs.
This statistic suggests that the monitoring role of the absent outside
directors is not being filled by other substitute nonmanagement
board members who have a reputational stake in the merits of the
issue.
Second, lawsuit firms may also have more inside board members
if they have ex ante nonmerit-related characteristics, which potential
outside board members may use to distinguish lawsuit firms from
other IPOs. 179 For example, outside board members may avoid
firms ex ante with particularly high levels of business risk-leaving
only insiders to sit on the board. 8 '
To test whether differences in board composition are due to
differences in the ex ante expected level of riskiness of the firm
rather than merit-related characteristics, we regressed the fraction
of outsiders on the board of directors against a dummy variable for
whether the firm was involved in a shareholder suit and against
control variables for the level of risk of the firm. Following
Professors Beatty and Zajac's methodology1 8' we formed a mea-
sure of the expected volatility of the firm by regressing the actual
standard deviation of returns for the first twenty trading days
177 Management held 4.8% more board seats in lawsuit IPO firms than in
nonlawsuit IPO firms.
" Arguably, underwriters and venture capitalists may also act as alternative
monitors for fraud, thereby serving as proxies for ex ante merit. Underwriters and
venture capitalists held 0.2% fewer board seats in lawsuit IPO firms than in
nonlawsuit IPO firms.
171 See Fletcher, supra note 22, at 501 (noting that "emerging growth companies,
in the face of the continuous threat of nuisance suits, find it difficult to attract
experienced outside directors since few directors dare risk damage to name and
reputation from involvement in securities fraud litigation").
"8 Outsiders may wish to avoid firms with high levels of ex ante risk because firm
failure may leave them personally vulnerable to shareholder suits. Firm failure may
also reduce the personal reputation of outsiders.
1' See Randolph P. Beatty & EdwardJ. Zajac, Managerial Incentives, Monitoring, and
Risk Bearing: A Study of Executive Compensation, Ownership, and Board Structure in
Initial Public Offerings, 39 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 313, 321 (1994).
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(exclusive of the day of the offering) of firms that went public
between 1975 and 1984 on a number of variables. The resulting
measure of risk is the fitted value of the standard deviation for firms
in our matched-pairs sample." 2 In addition to the risks disclosed
in the prospectus, smaller firms tend to pose more risk because they
are not as well established in their markets. Therefore, the most
recent 12-month preoffering sales in 1993 dollars are included in
the list of controls for the riskiness of the firm. Results of board
composition adjusted for total firm risk appear in Table 3.7.
TABLE 3.7: Board Composition Regression Results
Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable:
Fraction of Board Seats Average Number of Out-
Held By Outsiders side Board Seats Held
Constant 0.2468 0.7775
(0.0763) (0.2268)
Lawsuit Dummy -0.0584" -0.1549"
(0.0281) (0.0836)
Estimated Standard 1.1041 -3.8305
Deviation (1.242) (3.6944)
Sales in 1993 Dollars -9.7e-9 1.4e-7
(2.38e-7) (7.06e-7)
Adi. R2  0.0257 0.0201
Significant at the "" 1% level; - 5% level; " 10% level.
Even controlling for risk, the results indicate that the number of
outside directors is lower for lawsuit firms. Where the dependent
variable is the fraction of the board held by outsiders, for example,
the presence of a lawsuit IPO lowers the outsider-controlled fraction
by 5.84 percentage points. This result is statistically significant at
the five-percent level. Risk alone, therefore, does not explain the
" The regression equation for the fitted values of the standard deviation (E) of
returns is:
Z = constant + b*(number of risk factors listed) + c*(dummy if no risk factors
listed) + d*(frm-commitment dummy) + e
The point estimates and standard errors for the constant were 0.0633 and 0.0291,
respectively; for the number of risk factors 0.001779 and 0.000158; for the no-risk-
factors dummy 0.00715 and 0.002486; and for the firm-commitment dummy -0.02159
and 0.001955. A daily standard deviation of returns of 3%, for example, is measured
as 0.03 in the regression.
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different proportions of outsiders on the boards of lawsuit versus
nonlawsuit IPO issuers.
8 3
Third, a greater number of outside directors does not necessar-
ily translate into higher levels of monitoring and control over
fraudulent statements if the quality of the outside directors is lower
for lawsuit IPO firms. To test this proposition, we examined the
quality of the directors serving on the boards of firms experiencing
a lawsuit. We also examined the quality of directors on the board
of a firm by taking the total number of board seats of other public
companies held by members of the firm's board of directors and
then dividing this number by the size of the firm's board. The
results appear in Table 3.8 below.
TABLE 3.8: Quality of the Outside Directors on IPO Boards
Lawsuit Control p-value*
Average Number of Outside 0.419 0.566 0.079
Directorships Held
Average Board Size 6.05 6.59 0.080
(Number of Seats)
The p-value is the value of a two-sided test of the difference in mean values between
the two samples.
Among lawsuit IPOs, the average number of outside director-
ships held was 0.419. For the control IPOs, this number was 0.566.
This result is statistically significant at the ten-percent level. Lawsuit
IPOs, therefore, tended to have lower, not higher, quality boards of
directors. Because lawsuit IPOs correlate with this ex ante measure
of merit, this result further supports the enforcement theory.
Finally, board composition may be unrelated to merit if firms
with few outsiders on the board of directors are prone to succumb
to rent-extracting efforts by plaintiffs. Insider-controlled boards
may settle more frequently than outsider-dominated boards, for
example, because outside board members prefer to develop "no-
settle" reputations. Plaintiffs, however, most likely find it easier to
extract rent from outsider-dominated boards. Board members are
never part of the plaintiffs' class and therefore do not share in the
" Similarly, the result that the boards of lawsuit IPO issuers are of lower quality
than nonlawsuit IPO issuers does not disappear when we control for the level of
riskiness of the transactions in Table 3.7.
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distribution of the settlement amount. The settlement can be
viewed as a special dividend from the corporate treasury to a select
group of shareholders. Because outside directors typically hold a
minimal stake in the firm, their personal wealth is not substantially
affected by the amount of the settlement, and they, therefore, do
not have a strong incentive to advocate a hard-bargaining stand for
the firm in settlement negotiations.
Furthermore, especially in smaller firms, most outside directors
do not expect to dedicate a large fraction of their time to board
service. 184  Outside directors may also have general business
reputations that a public lawsuit would tarnish.18 5 Once a com-
plaint is filed, therefore, outside board members are likely to
advocate against trial or protracted negotiations. If merit were
unrelated to the number of outside directors, one would expect that
the firms with a higher fraction of outsiders would be more likely
to experience litigation from rent-seeking plaintiffs' attorneys.
Conversely, the fact that firms with a high fraction of outsiders
experience less litigation provides support for the theory that merit
does matter in securities class actions and that issuers with fewer
outside directors act more opportunistically when bringing
securities to the new-issues market.8 6
The outsider-director results, however, are only univariate, mean
comparisons. To determine whether these results, the underwriter
quality, and insider sell-off results above are robust, we calculated
a probit model of the incidence of suits in Table 3.9. We estimated
the probit model using the set of lawsuit IPOs and their matching
IPO firms.' 7
"s See, e.g., RonaldJ. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director:.
An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 875 (1991) ("[O]utside
directors lack the time, expertise, staff, and information to challenge management,
while management controls not only these resources but also has a direct and
powerful incentive to direct corporate policy without interference.").
185 See Alexander, supra note 12, at 531-32 (noting that outside directors are
unwilling to risk trial on the merits in securities litigation because of potentially large
damages awards and possible damage to the directors' reputations).
16 An alternative possibility is that plaintiffs' attorneys find it easier to win a
merit-based action against IPOs with fewer numbers of outsiders because courts
scrutinize the decisions of outsider-dominated boards less stringently than non-
outsider-dominated boards. However, neither section 11 nor Rule 10b-5 provides an
exception for outsider-dominated boards. Furthermore, as demonstrated below, the
result that IPO lawsuit firms have fewer outsiders on their boards loses statistical
significance when underwriter quality and other factors are taken into account.
187 We do not estimate the probit model for the entire sample of IPOs because we
lack data on the percentage of insider sell-off during the IPO and the board
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TABLE 3.9: Suit Incidence As a Function of Underwriter
Quality and Board Composition
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Suit Incidence Suit Incidence with Suit Incidence with
Offering Amount Multiple Controls
INTERCEPT -0.283* -0.271* -0.297"
(0.196) (0.196) (0.197)
C-M RATING 0.088*... 0.063* 0.081 "'°
(0.033) (0.037) (0.035)
FRACOUT -0.004 0.000 -0.025
(0.120) (0.119) (0.121)








Observations 198 198 198
Significant at the 20% level; *" 10% level; ". 5% level; .... 1% level.
The probit model takes the dependent variable as one if the firm experienced a
lawsuit and zero otherwise. The C-M RATING is the mean Carter-Manaster rating
of each IPO's underwriters. FRACOUT is the fraction of outside directors on the
board. OTHERDIR is the mean number of other directorships held by board
members. AMOUNT is the offering amount of the IPO in millions of dollars.
INSIDERSELL is the amount of insider sales during the offering as a percentage of
the total offering size. VCBACK is a dummy variable of whether the IPO issuer had
venture capital backers. A positive coefficient indicates that a rise in the independent
variable increases the likelihood ofexperiencinga class-action suit. Standard errors
appear in parentheses.
The first model in Table 3.9 assesses the interaction of under-
writer quality, the fraction of outsiders on the issuer's board, and
the level of insider sell-off during the IPO in explaining suit
incidence. In combination, the fraction of board outsiders loses its
statistical significance. Lawsuit IPOs do not have statistically
composition for every IPO in the sample. In addition, restricting the sample to IPO
lawsuit firms and the matching firms controls for size and industry effects.
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significant fewer numbers of outside directors. The boards of
lawsuit IPOs, however, do seem of lower quality as measured by the
number of outsider directorships held by board members.
Importantly, the result that higher underwriter quality does not
translate into lower incidence of suit carries through at an extremely
high level of statistical significance. In fact, as discussed above,
higher underwriter quality appears to lead to even more suits,
supporting the strike-suit theory.
We matched the matching firms in the sample, however, on the
basis of SIC code and sales, and not on the basis of offering size.
Therefore, it is possible that the statistically significant correlation
between higher underwriter quality and suit incidence is actually
driven by the larger size of the IPO lawsuit offerings. Larger
offerings tend to attract higher quality underwriters; similarly, larger
offerings are more likely to find themselves as targets of plaintiffs'
suits. The large size of an offering provides a greater number of
shares to spread the underwriters' commissions as well as larger
potential damages awards for plaintiffs' attorneys. To control for
offering size, therefore, the second model adds the offering amount
as an independent variable. Although this reduces the statistical
significance of the results from model one, the qualitative conclu-
sions remain the same: underwriter quality correlates strongly with
suit incidence while the percentage of outsiders on the board is
statistically insignificant.
Finally, the third model in Table 3.9 tests two other control
variables: the amount insiders sell as a fraction of the offering and
a dummy variable for whether a venture capitalist is involved with
the IPO firm. Similar to the univariate comparison of the mean
insider sell-off between the lawsuit IPO and matching IPO samples,
the probit results show that the relationship between insider sell-off
and suit incidence is statistically insignificant. In addition, the
presence of venture capitalists-an alternative proxy for ex ante
merit-does not seem to decrease the incidence of suits. In fact, suit
incidence increases with the presence of a venture capitalist,
although this result is also statistically insignificant. Importantly,
the result that higher underwriter quality leads to more suits is
robust and remains significant in model three.
In summary, the preoffering board composition of the lawsuit
and matching pair firms and aspects of the IPO transaction itself
serve as proxies for the lawsuit merit-related aspects of the IPO.
Firms with higher percentages of outsiders on the board of directors
should experience greater outside monitoring and therefore have
1996]
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fewer instances of fraud or other illegal activities connected with the
offering. The results demonstrate that lawsuit firms did, in fact,
have boards with a lower fraction of outsiders than the nonlawsuit
matching firms, providing support for the enforcement theory of
securities class actions. A probit analysis of the relationship
between the incidence of suits and board composition, underwriter
quality, and insider sell-off during the IPO, however, demonstrates
that in combination only underwriter quality remains statistically
significant; suit incidence rises with underwriter quality, in support
of the strike-suit theory.
C. The Settlement Process
This Section examines the settlement process in order to
discriminate between the enforcement and strike-suit theories.
Under the enforcement theory, the settlement amount should vary
with merit-related factors and the expected damages award at
trial.'88 For example, as the expected damages award increases,
the likely settlement award will also rise; plaintiffs' attorneys with
large expected damages awards will not settle unless provided at
least the amount they expect to receive from trial.'8 9 The strike-
suit theory, conversely, predicts that the settlement amount will not
vary with merit-related factors. Under Rosenberg and Shavell, for
example, strike suits receive the defendants' cost savings from
avoiding the litigation, distraction, and reputation costs of respond-
ing to the plaintiffs' complaint.' 0 Similarly, in Bebchuk's model,
strike suits receive an amount based on the saved litigation costs as
well as the fraction of the population of suits which are NEV
suits. '' In either case, the settlement amount for strike suits does
not turn on the merits of the particular IPO. Alexander's particular
form of the strike-suit theory, conversely, posits that settlement
amounts, although not related to merits, should vary proportionally
18 See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
9 Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper found that the settlement amounts of their
sample of 91 securities lawsuits were relatively insensitive to the level of damages
incurred; they did, however, find a statistically significant relationship between the log
transformation of the settlement and damages amounts. See Francis et al., supra note
32, at 51-52. Their study provides a useful benchmark for our investigation into the
relationship between settlement amounts and the level of potential damages, although
Rule 10b-5 and section 11 have different requirements.
190 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
191 See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
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with the maximum potential damages award. 92 To test these
different strike-suit theories against the enforcement theory, this
Section analyzes whether merit impacts the settlement amounts.
Under all the strike-suit theories, merit should not matter.
First, we regressed the settlement amount for each lawsuit IPO
against the IPO's potential damages award. We calculated the
potential damages award for each lawsuit IPO as the difference
between the offer price and the price at the end of the class period
multiplied by the number of shares issued.193 Although section 11
and Rule 10b-5 typically calculate the damages award based on the
stock price at the time of the filing of suit,194 we used the price at
the end of the class period to control for exogenous factors
affecting the stock price between the end of the class period and the
filing of suit.'95 If the closing bid at the end of the class period
was not available, we used the daily low trading price during the
class period. We adjusted all damage and settlement amounts for
inflation in 1993 dollars.
9 6
Then, to determine whether merits affect the settlement
amount, we also regressed the type of misleading statement alleged
by the plaintiffs. Courts treat disclosures regarding objective
information, such as inventory levels or revenues, differently from
subjective "soft" information such as growth projections or
discussions of the ability of management. In particular, courts tend
to reject claims of misleading "soft" informational disclosures much
more frequently as immaterial to a reasonable investor. 9 ' Under
' See Alexander, supra note 12, at 545.
The price at the end of the class period was obtained from the Daily Stock
Price Record.
19 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
1 To the extent these exogenous factors are unrelated to the misleading
information, defendants may reduce the potential damages award. See Securities Act
§ 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1994); see also supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text
(discussing problems with approximating the potential damages award). This measure
is not perfect. It may overstate the potential damages award to the extent other
exogenous factors affecting the stock price occurred prior to the end of the class
period. It may also understate the potential damages award to the extent the market
did not know of the issuer's misleading disclosure until the filing of suit.
'9 The potential damages award is adjusted to 1993 dollars from the end date of
the class period. For settlements, the amounts are adjusted to 1993 dollars from the
date a court first approves the settlement or the first public announcement of the
settlement, whichever is earlier. If neither of these dates are available, the settlement
date is treated as four years after the IPO.
197 See Searls v. Glasser, 64 F.3d 1061, 1067 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that
predictions of "high" disposition gains are "too vague... to affect the mix of more
detailed information upon which a reasonable investor typically relies"); Hillson
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the enforcement theory, therefore, "soft" misleading information
claims should result in lower merit-based expected damages. Merit-
based settlement amounts, therefore, should reflect these lower
expected damages.
198
We examined press reports and court documents to determine
the type of allegedly misleading statements or omissions in the
offering prospectus or registration statement. Information on the
source of the misleading information arose in eighty-seven of the
123 lawsuit IPO cases: in forty-two cases, the misleading informa-
tion involved discussion of the business of the firm or of the ability
of management, which include both predictive and subjective
elements. In twenty-three cases, the source of the misleading
information appeared within financial statements of the IPO, which
most often dealt with objective, verifiable historical facts. Finally,
twenty-two cases involved misleading statements dealing with both
the financial statements and the business of the firm. Table 3.10
below presents the regression results.
Partners v. Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d 204, 220 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that "imposing
liability on companies for predictions of future growth, which are often.., wrong,
would lead to the further proliferation of lawsuits") (citing Raab v. General Physics
Corp., 4 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 1993)).
19' Looking at the issuer's information disclosure policy during the offering may
provide an alternative test of the merit versus strike-suit theories. Francis, Philbrick,
and Schipper found that firms involved in shareholder lawsuits tend to have more
active public disclosure than their nonlawsuit counterparts. See Francis et al., supra
note 32, at 49. Two alternative hypotheses explain these results. First, lawsuit firms
may tend to seek ex ante to mislead the public and therefore disclose more
information to inflate the price of their shares. This corresponds to our definition
of the enforcement theory because the enforcement theory hypothesizes a correlation
between those firms which were sued and those firms which demonstrated ex ante
misbehavior. Second, firms more prone to being sued may disclose more information
in an attempt to protect themselves from liability.
In our sample, we found that IPOs involved in shareholder lawsuits are less
likely to include a separate section on risk factors in their offering prospectus, and
when they do, the IPOs tend to list fewer factors. In both cases, however, the
difference is not statistically significant. This result is not necessarily inconsistent with
the enforcement theory hypothesis because disclosure through risk factors may not
lend itself as well to misleading the public as general informational disclosure. The
results, on the other hand, do appear to contradict their theory that firms more
prone to suit attempt to protect themselves ex ante through increased information
disclosure. This may provide some indirect support for the strike-suit theory. Firms
that realize ex ante that regardless of their actions, they will be sued if their stock
price plummets will have no incentive to issue additional information ex ante.
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TABLE 3.10: Settlement Regression Results
Panel A: The sample consists of all IPOs with class periods less than one year in
length for which the type of misleading information could be determined. The
dependent variable is the settlement amount. The variable Damages refers to the
potential damages award. We run an ordinary least squares regression (standard





















F-test of difference in the fit of the regression: 1.0869
Significant at the - 1% level; "" 5% level; * 10% level.











F-test of difference in the fit of the regression: 0.8984.
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Panel C: The sample consists of all IPOs with identifiable class periods for which the
type of misleading information is known. The dependent variable is settlement





Damages x Accounting 0.0306
(0.0560)
Damages x Both 0.1071
(0.0581)
Adj. R2  0.412 0.569
F 36.70 23.48
F-test of difference in the fit of the regression: 10.11-
Significant at the *** 1% level; '° 5% level; * 10% level.
In the first two panels of Table 3.10, we limited the sample to
those firms with a class period of less than one year. For class
actions with periods of less than one year, the calculation of the
potential damages award measure is more likely to measure plain-
tiffs' maximum possible damages accurately, because within the first
year, most defendants are still subject to the lockup agreements they
entered into at the time of the IPO. 19" As the class period length-
ens, the possibility that some aftermarket trading involves shares
sold by members of the defendants' class (for example, insiders)
increases. This may affect the potential damages award measure in
a manner irrelevant to the plaintiffs' damages,"' increasing the
199 Insiders in an IPO often enter into lockup agreements as part of the IPO
whereby they promise not to sell their shares in secondary-market trading until a
certain time period after the IPO. See Larry W. Sonsini, The Process of Going Public
for First Time Issuers: An Overview, in CAPITAL FORMATION: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC
FINANCINGS 1984, at 265, 276 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 335, 1984) (noting that the typical lockup agreement is between 90 and
180 days after the initial public offering). At least 36 of the lawsuit IPOs in our
sample included a lockup agreement.
200 The sale by insiders of shares in secondary-market trading may result in a
greater number of shares outstanding than the number of shares sold in the IPO,
resulting in an overestimate of the potential damages award. Similarly, to the extent
purchasers of these post-IPO insider-sold shares are included in the scope of the
lawsuit, the damage measure for these shares should be measured from the price at
which the shares were sold by the insiders and not the IPO price.
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level of noise in the relationship between the potential damages
award measure and the plaintiffs' damages.
The basic model for settlement amount appears in panel A of
Table 3.10. The model indicates that the settlement amount is
highly sensitive to the level of potential damages. For each dollar
in additional potential damages, the settlement amount rises by
twenty-one cents, a level similar to that reported by Alexander.
20 1
These results, therefore, provide some support for Alexander's
version of the strike-suit hypothesis. This support, however, is not
unqualified: for merit-based suits, one would also expect to see
settlement amounts rise with the level of potential damages. To test
whether merit matters, the second model in panel A tests whether
the sensitivity of the settlement amount to the potential damages
award varies with the type of misleading information in the offering
prospectus. The results of the second model again show that the
settlement amount is highly sensitive to the potential damages
award. Moreover, controlling for the type of misleading informa-
tion in the prospectus has a negligible (F = 1.0869) effect on the fit
of the model. Merit-related factors, therefore, do not significantly
affect the relationship between the settlement amount and the
potential damages award.
Panel B of Table 3.10 repeats the tests of Panel A, controlling
for the effect of overly influential observations in the sample. One
firm, Diasonics, had a potential damages award twice as large as any
other firm in the sample. The removal of Diasonics from the
sample, however, did not modify the basic conclusions. Only the
potential damages award explains the settlement amount with any
statistical significance. In all cases, the adjusted R2 is over 0.50,
indicating that variation in damages accounts for over half of the
variation in settlement amounts. Furthermore, the test whether
merit-related factors affect the fit of the regression demonstrates a
statistically insignificant difference between the fit of the two
regressions (F = 0.8984).
Extending the regression model to include IPOs with longer
class periods results in a diminished, but still statistically significant,
relationship between the settlement amount and the potential
damages award. These results appear in Panel C of Table 3.10. We
exclude one outlier, Crazy Eddie, from our sample. 20 2 The lower
201 See Alexander, supra note 12, at 519 (finding an average settlement rate of
26%).
' Crazy Eddie had the highest ratio of settlement award to potential damage
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value of the adjusted R2 in cases with longer class periods indicates
that the potential damages award explains less of the variation in
settlement amounts as the class period increases. This is due in part
to the effects of the passage of time and in part to the growing
inaccuracy of the calculated measure for the potential damages
award. Unlike in Panels A and B, however, the F-test statistic for
the difference in fit between the two models in Panel C is statistical-
ly significant at the one-percent level. This could, however, be due
to the higher degree of noise in the calculation of the potential
damages award for longer class periods. Furthermore, the coeffi-
cients for the merit-related factors in Panel C are statistically
insignificant.
In summary, the results of this Section provide evidence that
settlement amounts track strongly with potential damages awards.
However, the mere correlation between the settlement amount and
the potential damages award is also consistent with the enforcement
theory of class actions. To the extent that the potential damages
award acts as a proxy for the harm resulting from fraud on the
issuer's part, the potential damages award against the issuers that
were actually sued should correlate with the amount of wrongdoing.
It is unlikely, however, that merit correlates perfectly with the
potential damages award. Two IPOs with identical potential
damages awards of ten million dollars, for example, are unlikely to
have exactly the same amount of ex ante fraud. Significantly, the
regressions also demonstrate that the sensitivity of the settlement
amount to the potential absolute damages award does not vary with
the type of misleading information-indicating that merit does not
matter. Therefore, that settlement amounts track consistently with
the potential damages award provides some evidence for the strike-
suit theory.
amount in the sample. There are a number of reasons to believe the case of Crazy
Eddie is atypical. First, the firm had one of the longest class periods in the whole
sample. Second, it was one of the few cases where the CEO, Eddie Antar, was also
the subject of a related criminal case. Interestingly enough, plaintiffs' attorneys were
praised in the Crazy Eddie litigation for their diligence and assistance to public
enforcement efforts. See In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 824 F. Supp. 320, 323, 326-27
(E.D.N.Y. 1993). The results of the full sample (including Crazy Eddie), which are not
reported here, are similar to those in Panel C.
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D. Event Study of Returns at Time of Suit Filing
The final test between the enforcement and strike-suit theories
examines the reaction of the capital markets at the time a securities-
fraud suit is filed. Using the market model as a proxy for the
returns generating process, we tested the existence of abnormal
returns at the time a suit is filed using the event study methodolo-
gies outlined by Professors Brown and Warner."' The market
model provides a prediction of the returns the IPO lawsuit stocks
should experience at any point in time based on an estimated
relationship between the IPO stocks' returns and the returns of a
value-weighed portfolio of all market stocks." 4 Abnormal returns
differing from the market model predicted returns indicate new,
unanticipated information on the value of the IPO lawsuit firm.
Furthermore, the sign of the abnormal returns provides evidence on
whether the market considers the new information as positively or
negatively impacting the value of the IPO lawsuit firm.
Because the filing of a securities-fraud class action is a relatively
rare event,20 5 we predict that the filing of suit provides new
information to the market regardless of whether it is merit or strike-
suit based. The sign of the abnormal returns, however, may differ.
Both merit and strike-suit motivated actions will reduce shareholder
value to the extent that the defendant-issuer must expend resources
in litigation. Furthermore, those purchasing the IPO stock on the
date the suit is filed are not typically included in the class
period.2 ' Therefore, any judgment or settlement paid for either
a merit or strike-suit motivated action will reduce the value of
shares traded after the filing of suit. Both merit and strike-suit
actions should experience negative abnormal returns. Merit suits,
however, may result in changes in the issuer's board of directors or
executive compensation structure or may attract the attention of
potential outside bidders for the company, all potentially raising
shareholder value. To the extent these effects outweigh the
20s See generally Stephen J. Brown & Jerold B. Warner, Using Daily Stock Returns:
The Case of Event Studies, 14 J. FIN. EcON. 3 (1985) (describing the methodology of
using risk-adjusting returns in event studies).
204 This relationship is based on historical data on the covariance of a particular
IPO stock's returns and the value-weighed market portfolio returns.
2 See supra part I.A.
206 Purchasers buying after the filing of suit cannot claim that they relied on
misleading information at the time of the IPO because the filing of suit signals to the
market the misleading information.
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value. To the extent these effects outweigh the negative impact of
a suit, merit-based suits may generate abnormal positive returns.
The results presented in Table 3.11 indicate that firms that
were targets of a shareholder suit experienced negative abnormal
returns in the three-day window centered on the filing date of the
suit. This indicates that the market did not fully anticipate the
decision of the plaintiffs' attorney to file a complaint. We analyzed
trading volume around the filing of suit date to determine whether
the information signaled by the filing affects investor expecta-
tions.20 7 A large increase in trading volume indicates that individ-
ual investor expectations have changed and that there is greater
dispersion among investors regarding the value of the firm. The
results in Table 3.11 again show a statistically significant increase in
trading volume on the event date and in the three-day window
around the event date, indicating that the filing of suit caused
investors to revise their individual expectations regarding the value
of the firm. Clearly, the market failed to fully anticipate these suits.
TABLE 3.11: Market Reaction to the Filing Announcement
(t-value in parenthesis)
Abnormal Trading
Average Abnormal Volume As a Fraction
Event Window Return of Total Float
Day 0 -1.30%* 0.001903-
(-1.76) (2.56)
Day -1 to Day +1 -3.33%"' °  0.006642-'
(-2.605) (5.18)
Significant at the *** 1% level; "" 5% level; ' 10% level.
More significantly, the results in Table 3.11 fail to rule out strike
suits. During the one-day event window centered on the suit filing
date, the average abnormal return for suits was -1.30%; this was
significant at the ten-percent level. The return around the three-day
window was -3.33% at the one-percent level. As discussed above, a
negative return is consistent with both the merit and strike-suit
theories. Although these results do not conclusively rule out merit-
20' For a theory to test price reaction to earning announcements, see William H.
Beaver, The Information Content of Annual Earnings Announcements, 6 J. ACCT.
RESEARCH 67 (Supp. 1968).
FRAUD IN THE NEW-ISSUES MARKET
based suits, given the findings of the other tests in this Article, they
do provide more evidence for the general hypothesis that many
securities-fraud class actions are frivolous.
CONCLUSION
Justice Brandeis once wrote, "Sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman."0 8 To
provide an incentive for issuers in the new-issues market to disclose
information truthfully, the law gives IPO investors a variety of
remedies in case of fraud or violations of the rigid procedural
requirements imposed on new securities issuers.2 9  Some com-
mentators, however, have argued that such remedies fail to enforce
the securities laws; rather, they act as a form of inefficient insurance
for IPO stock value.2 10 According to this story, armies of plain-
tiffs' attorneys sit on the sidelines-or more realistically in front of
their computer terminals-waiting for the stock price of an IPO in
aftermarket trading to drop. Faced with such a suit, issuers and
their underwriting team will invariably settle due to risk aversion,
liability insurance for outside directors and officers, and the
negative impact that litigation will have on future business. n
To counter the strike-suit theory of securities class actions, other
commentators have argued that the remedies provided by the
securities laws do, in fact, ensure that issuers ex ante take care to
divulge information necessary for investors to make their investment
decisions. 212  According to the enforcement theory, plaintiffs'
attorneys-by facilitating this process-serve a valuable purpose.
Without such attorneys, enforcement of the securities laws would be
left solely to the SEC. However, because the SEC lacks information
about which issuers are acting fraudulently and lacks the resources
to pursue all such issuers, SEC enforcement is far from ideal.
This Article's empirical results show that most securities-fraud
class actions are, in fact, frivolous. The evidence indicates that suits
tend to correlate with higher quality underwriters. To the extent
higher quality underwriters associate with higher quality offerings,
this correlation demonstrates that something other than merit drives
208 Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY: AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT
92 (1914).
209 See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
210 See Alexander, supra note 12, at 570-73.
211 See id.
212 See Lerach, supra note 18, at 55-76.
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plaintiffs' attorneys. Moreover, the amount insiders sell of their
own holdings during an IPO is not statistically different between
lawsuit and nonlawsuit IPOs. Because insiders will choose to inflate
the price of their IPO when they have the most to gain from a
higher IPO price, insider sell-off is taken as an ex ante measure of
the IPO's merit. The lack of any statistically significant difference,
therefore, also supports the theory that something other than merit
motivates plaintiffs' attorneys. Finally, once a suit is filed against an
issuing team, almost all of them end in settlement with the absolute
level of damages accounting for a large fraction of the variation in
settlement amount between cases.2 1 3 Furthermore, merit-related
factors do not affect this relationship.
On the other hand, evidence exists pointing to at least some
merit-based enforcement actions. IPO issuers with fewer outsiders
on their board of directors experience a higher incidence of class
actions. The boards of IPOs which experience securities fraud-class
actions are also of inferior quality than nonlawsuit IPOs. To the
extent board composition is a proxy for the presence of ex ante
opportunistic behavior on the issuer's part, these results suggest
that the merits do matter-at least with respect to the plaintiffs'
attorneys' initial decision whether or not to file suit. A probit
analysis of the relationship between the incidence of suits and board
composition, underwriter quality, and insider sell-off during the
IPO, however, demonstrates that only underwriter quality remains
statistically significant; suit incidence rises with underwriter quality,
in support of the strike-suit theory.
Surely, at least some securities-fraud suits are merit based. The
presence of these merit-based suits provides deterrence against ex
ante fraud. Even if, for example, the ex post incidence of merit-
based IPO suits is, in fact, only one out of every ten suits, this one
suit may, in turn, deter many times its number of fraudulent
IPOs.2 14 Nevertheless, the strong evidence that most suits are
frivolous should lead lawmakers to reconsider the desirability of
allowing securities-fraud class actions directed at IPOs. Although
IPO securities class actions were small in number, the average
settlement amount per suit was $5.8 million in 1998 dollars.
215 See supra part II.A.2 (reporting the resolution and disposition of the lawsuit
IPOs).
214 It is, however, unclear how to quantify the amount of "phantom" fraud which
ex post merit-based suits actually deters ex ante. Romano makes a similar point in
her study. See Romano, supra note 29, at 85.
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Because the incidence of suits was 3.5% and the settlement rate was
75.6%, all IPOs in our sample ex ante faced an expected litigation
liability of $145,000 in 1993 dollars. To the extent all suits are in
fact frivolous, this expected liability functions as a tax on IPOs.
2 15
Furthermore, this may understate the actual expected litigation
liability that firms in certain SIC groupings face. Particular
industries in our IPO sample encountered a far greater proportion
of securities-fraud class actions. IPO securities litigation, for
example, placed a much greater burden on computer IPOs. To
reduce this tax on capital formation while maintaining deterrence
of misleading information, lawmakers should consider greater
public enforcement or alternative means of enabling private market
mechanisms to self-police against fraud in the market.
2 16
The results also indicate quite strongly that the incentives of
plaintiffs' attorneys drive IPO securities class actions. As mentioned
above, suits cluster in certain SIC groupings and rise in frequency
as both the offering amount and aftermarket losses of an IPO
increase. 217 Plaintiffs' attorneys face several fixed costs of litiga-
tion regardless of the potential damages award. They must, for
instance, conduct depositions, file motions, and learn about the
particular circumstances of the issuer and its industry. Unless the
expected fee-often a function of the potential damages award-
exceeds this fixed cost, plaintiffs' attorneys will not file suit
regardless of either the merits or strike-suit motivations. Similarly,
plaintiffs' attorneys incur a cost to gain knowledge on a particular
industry. This fixed cost results in plaintiffs' attorneys focusing only
on certain industry groups.
Our findings on the incentives of plaintiffs' attorneys indicate
that enforcement-to the extent it exists-occurs only for larger sized
IPOs in certain industry groups. Private enforcement, therefore,
leaves a large gap among smaller sized IPOs and IPOs in less fre-
quently litigated SIC groups. In response, the SEC should focus its
public enforcement efforts on areas lacking aggressive private
enforcement.
215 Because the average offering amount was $16.6 million in 1993 dollars, this
represented a tax of 1.1% on all IPOs.21 6 See, e.g., Stephen Choi, Misleading Information in the New Issues Markets: The
Interdependence ofAntifraud Mechanisms (Feb. 12, 1996) (unpublished manuscript
on file with author) (analyzing the relationship between legal liability and market-
based mechanisms to control misleading information in the securities markets).21 Seesupra part II.A.3-4 (reporting the distribution of IPOs and lawsuits by IPO
offering amount and aftermarket losses).
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Only further research will sufficiently illuminate the incentives
of plaintiffs' attorneys and the other drivers behind securities-fraud
class actions. While our effort focused on the initial public
offerings market, to the extent other securities markets are similar
to this market, our findings apply to securities-fraud suits in these
other markets as well.
